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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL PRESSURES
ON SENTENCING JUDGES
I. Introduction
On the night of January 23, 1980, a party of six men met a woman
while drinking together in a Massachusetts tavern.' In the tavern
parking lot, one of the men joined the woman in her car and yelled to
his companions to follow. 2 They trailed her car to a wooded area
whereupon the men destroyed her car and raped, sodomized and
3
assaulted the woman.
On October 5, 1981, five of the men pleaded guilty to rape, unnatural rape and malicious destruction of property. 4 The court accepted
their guilty pleas and sentenced each to a suspended terms of three-tofive years imprisonment. 6
1. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 15 (Super. Ct. first criminal session
Oct. 5, 1981).
2. Id. at 16. Shortly after the meeting, the woman left the bar. Id. at 15. Later in
the evening, the men "exited the bar, were out on the sidewalk when they observed
th[e] woman drive by and wave to them. She pulled her car into a parking lot across
the street from the bar." Id. One of the defendants "ran from the group and ran over
to the woman's car and entered the front seat of the car ..
." Id. This individual
was indicted for kidnapping, but the indictment was dismissed. Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 261 n.2, 435 N.E.2d 330, 331 n.2 (1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (nos. 82-203 & 82-5159).
3. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 14-19 (first criminal session). Following these events, the victim was left to wander naked in the woods, id. at 17-18,
"bleeding . . . , crying and . . . asking where her car was." Id. at 19. Some of the
defendants left the scene while others remained behind forcing further sexual acts
upon the victim in a promised exchange for her car. Id. Then "the men discussed
what they were going to do with the lady [and] suggested leaving her off on the road
in Holbrook with no clothes, hide her in the car, and leave her there." Id. One
defendant drove the remaining men and the victim away from the scene and later
returned with the victim to get some of her clothes before leaving her in the vicinity
of a fire station, id. at 19-20, which she entered, "disheveled, partially clothed ...
hysterical [with] some obvious bruises about her person." Id. at 14.
4. Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 261, 435 N.E.2d 330, 331,
(1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (nos. 82-203 & 82-5159).
The defendants were also indicted for assault and battery. Id. at 261 n.2, 435 N.E.2d
at 331 n.2.
5. The judge cited his reasons for the suspension of sentence as follows: the
Assistant District Attorney had recommended a light sentence prior to the judge's
acceptance of the guilty plea; the government's chief witness, one of the participants
who had been granted immunity, had given inconsistent statements; the victim, who
had attempted suicide and was under psychiatric care, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27,
1981, at 22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at A20, col. 1, was unavailable to
testify. The defendants, who were first offenders from "very close, supportive families" were contrite, though they maintained that the sexual acts were consensual; the
judge concluded that neither confinement nor correctional treatment was necessary
to protect the public. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 2-4 (Super. Ct.
second criminal session Oct. 9, 1981).
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The news of the suspension of sentence provoked an intense public
outcry. Both the judge and the governor who appointed him were
criticized. 7 The governor, in turn, strongly rebuked the sentencing
judge for his leniency. 8 Four days after the sentencing, the judge
revoked the suspensions and reinstated the prison terms. 9 His stated
reasons for this action did not include any reference to public or
political pressure.' 0 Defense counsel maintained that the revocation
was "improper" in that the judge had succumbed to the "demands of
the public and the Governor."" Although the case was vacated for
resentencing on other grounds,12 one legal scholar stated that "[w]e
6. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 261, 435 N.E.2d at 331. The defendants were also
given two years probation and assessed court costs of $500 which were to be paid at
the rate of $5.00 per week over the two year term. Id. at 261 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 331
n.3.
7. See, e.g., Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27, 1981, at 1, col. 1 ("[H]undreds of
enraged phone calls attacking the sentence[s]" were received by radio stations, the
judge, the prosecutor and Governor Edward J. King of Massachusetts); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1981, at A20, col. 1 ("The lightness of the sentence prompted a public outcry
....").Many of the phone calls made to the governor, who had appointed the
judge, threatened that "they'd never vote for him again," since "le had promised law
and order." Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27, 1981, at 22, col. 2. A state legislator
introduced a resolution denouncing the sentences and the state caucus of women
legislators issued a public statement that it was "outraged." Id., col. 3.
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at A20, col. 1. The governor called a press
conference on Oct. 8, 1981, during which he said: "I don't blame people for being
mad. I'm mad. I appointed this judge. I want to know, and the people have a right to
know, why five men who pleaded guilty to raping a woman only have to dig into
their pockets for five dollars once a week as punishment." Los Angeles Times, Nov.
27, 1981, at 22, col. 2. He also announced that he was submitting a bill to the
legislature that would allow prosecutors to appeal judicial sentences and wrote a
letter to the Chief Justice of the State Superior Court asking the justice to consider
whether the sentences were consistent with the court's sentencing guidelines. Id. The
Los Angeles Times viewed these actions as political gestures. Id.
9. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 261, 435 N.E.2d at 331.
10. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 4-5 (second criminal session). The
trial judge questioned the legality of the suspension of sentence, id. at 5, pursuant to
a Massachusetts statute which prohibits the granting of a suspended sentence when a
person is "convicted of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for life."
Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 263, 432 N.E.2d at 332. Rape is punishable in Massachusetts
by imprisonment for life or for any term of years. Id. at 263 n.8, 435 N.E.2d at 332
n.8. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately construed the ambiguously written statute to mean that the prohibition against suspension is inapplicable
to crimes which are punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of
years. Thus, the sentences originally imposed were held to be properly suspended. Id.
at 267, 435 N.E.2d at 334. The trial judge also noted the prosecution's objection to
the imposition of a suspended sentence and expressed a desire to have the case tried
on the merits. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 5 (second criminal session).
11. Brief for Defendants at 36, Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. 260, 435 N.E.2d 330.
12. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 276, 435 N.E.2d at 338-39. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that although the trial judge did have the power to
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are seeing a judge responding to public
and political pressures that
13
should not influence the judiciary.."
The foregoing case, Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth,14 illustrates
three potential types of pressure on a sentencing judge: public opinion, opinions voiced by influential political figures, and opinions expressed by the press. This Comment will explore the question of
whether a sentencing judge may consider any of these pressures with15
out violating the constitutional principles of procedural due process,
the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment,' equal protection,' 7 double jeopardy, 8 and the common law-statutory proscription against abuse of discretion.' 9 Emphasis will be placed on public
opinion, which often parallels the voices of those least heard by the
20
criminal justice system: the victims.

revise and revoke the sentences pursuant to Massachusetts law and that the principle
of double jeopardy was not violated, id. at 268, 435 N.E.2d at 334, the defendants
did not receive proper notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing wherein
revocation took place. Therefore, the sentences were vacated and the defendants
ordered to be resentenced. Id. at 275-76, 435 N.E.2d at 338-39. Resentencing proceedings were ultimately resumed and the defendants' motions to withdraw their
guilty pleas were granted in order to preserve the double jeopardy claim. Defendants
were ordered to stand trial on December 2, 1982. judge orders 2d rape trialfor5 men
in Holbrook case, The Boston Globe, July 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at A20, col. 2. It should be noted that Rule 29 of
the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he trial judge upon
his own motion or the written motion of a defendant filed within sixty days after the
imposition of a sentence ... may, upon such terms and conditions as he shall order,
revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done."
MAss. ANN. LAWS, R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the revocation of the suspended
sentences was proper, pursuant to this statute. See note 10 supra.
14. 386 Mass. 260, 261, 435 N.E.2d 330, 331 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (nos. 82-203 & 82-5159).
15. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law" by the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth
amendment similarly binds the states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, and is applied to the states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
17. The fourteenth amendment provides that a state shall not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
18. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," U.S. CONST. amend. V, and
is applied to the states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
19. See note 113 infra and accompanying text.
20. See text accompanying note 221 infra. Victims of crime commonly hail from
such disparate groups as the elderly, women, blacks, and the poor. L. FoRER,
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Following this analysis, the sources and effects of external pressures
on a sentencing judge will be examined, including: pressure from
organized citizens' groups, the press, the electorate, politicians, general community condemnation, and victims of crime. Throughout this
discussion, a differentiation will be made between those pressures, the
consideration of which would violate established principles of law,
and those which would enhance the sentencing process through increased judicial awareness. This Comment concludes by arguing that
(1) a judge can and should be fully cognizant of diverse public opinion
concerning the seriousness of an offense, validly expressed pursuant to
the first amendment freedoms of speech and press, 21 without incurring
constitutional violations, and (2) increasing judicial awareness of the
impact of a crime on a victim's life is one step toward giving voice to
large segments of the community who are routinely targeted for spe22
cific types of crimes.
II. Limitations on Judicial Discretion in Sentencing:
The Effect of Public Opinion
In theory, sentencing is of great significance because it represents
the price society exacts for particular crimes.2 3 In the indeterminate

CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS,

A

TRIAL JUDGE REFLECTS ON CRIME AND

PUNISHMENT

36,

RESEARCH & FORECASTS, INC., THE FIGGIE REPORT ON FEAR OF CRIME:
AMERICA AFRAID, PART I: THE GENERAL PUBLIC 36-37, 42 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

225-26 (1980);

FIGIE REPORT]. Concrete fear of specific violent crimes among such groups as blacks,

women, the young, and inhabitants of large cities is statistically justified by the high
rates of victimization of these groups. FIGGIE REPORT, supra, at 36-37. The high rates
of victimization are based on murder statistics for the young and blacks, id., and rape
statistics for women. Id. at 37. The highest degree of "formless fear" of vague dangers
in their everyday environments is experienced by the old, who suffer "noticeable
rates of victimization." Id. at 52, 55. For an example of the elderly comprising a
group routinely targeted for mugging, see text accompanying notes 164-70 infra.
21. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," U.S. CONST. amend. I, and is applied to
the states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
22. For a discussion of victim legislation see text accompanying notes 229-35 infra.
23. People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 324 N.E.2d 878, 880, 365 N.Y.S.2d 518,
520-21 (1975). In practical terms, sentencing is a crucial stage in the criminal process
because most cases are plea-bargained. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264
n.2 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (90.2% of federal convictions in 1964 based on
plea of guilty); Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing From Mapp to Mempa
to McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REv. 25, 26 (1970) ("[a]pproximately ninety percent of
those convicted of felonies plead guilty"). "Plea bargaining," recognized and encouraged by the United States Supreme Court as "an essential component of the administration of justice," Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260, has been defined as an "exchange of a
plea of guilty for some anticipated benefit from the prosecutor." Note, Procedural
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sentencing 24 scheme still prevalent today,2 5 a sentencing judge has
broad discretion 26 in determining the sentence to be imposed2 7 and is
largely unfettered in the sources and types of information that may be
considered. 28 Indeterminate sentencing and broad judicial discretion
are based on the ideal of rehabilitation of the offender. 29 Recently,
interest in the idea of "desert"-that the severity of the penalty should
depend on the seriousness of the offense- 30 has revived.3 ' These two
concepts, the tailoring.of sentences to the individual offender 32 and
Due Process at JudicialSentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 829 (1968). See
also Perry, 36 N.Y.2d at 119, 324 N.E.2d at 880, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21 ("in light of
the overwhelming percentage of dispositions via plea negotiation, guilt or innocence
may not be deemed by some defendants to be of prime concern").
24. An "indeterminate senteqce" refers "to any sentence of confinement in which
the actual term to be served is not known on the day of judgment but will be subject,
within a substantial range, [set by statute], to the later decision of a board of parole
or some comparable agency." Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV.

1, 29 (1972).

25. See A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 3, at 13 (1978) ("[The] rehabilitative
sentencing philosophy motivates what is today the most common sentencing system
in this country: the indeterminate sentence.") (footnotes omitted); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11

(1976) ("The dominant sentencing structure currently employed in the United States
is based on the indeterminate sentence, so-called because it is characterized by wide
separations between the legislatively authorized minimum and maximum sentences
for generally defined crimes."). For a general discussion of determinate sentencing
and its growing popularity see A. CAMPBELL, supra, §§ 31-33 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
See also Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement: Excessive Punishment
Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1104 ("Calls for determinate sentencing systems, already heeded by several legislatures, abound and almost
certainly will increase.") (footnotes omitted).
26. Prosecutorial and parole board discretion are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the sharing of sentencing power by prosecutors, judges and
the parole board, see Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733,
735-36 (1980).
27. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (case remanded to trial
court for reconsideration of defendant's sentence which was based in part on prior
convictions obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel).
28. Id. See also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (death sentence
for convicted murderer affirmed although information as to defendant's previous
criminal record considered without permitting him to confront or cross-examine
witnesses on that subject); FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(2).
29. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, § 3, at 13; Frankel, supra note 24, at 29. In
criticizing the goal of rehabilitation via imprisonment, however, Judge Frankel
stated: "we have no right to keep people confined ostensibly to rehabilitate them
when we lack the means of rehabilitation." Id. at 34.
30. Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts, in SENTENCING

243 (H. Gross & A. Von Hirsch eds. 1981).

31. SENTENCING 237 (H. Gross & A. Von Hirsch eds. 1981).
32. "[T]he punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 (citing People v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 387, 392, 169 N.E. 619,
621 (1930)). See also United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (W.D. Wash.
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consideration of the relative gravity of the offense, represent two
opposing forces in the sentencing equation. 33 If indeterminate
sentencing within statutory limits is chiefly concerned with the
offender and not the offense, 34 the inclusion of "current community
consensus about the relative gravity of offenses" 35 as a factor in
judicial sentencing decisions may help to offset any imbalance. At the
same time, the defendant must be protected by constitutional rights
which operate to curtail a sentencing judge's discretion. These include
the prescription for due process and equal protection and the
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and double
jeopardy.36 In addition, a judge's sentencing decision may not reflect
an abuse of discretion. 37 As long as these principles are respected, an
appellate court generally will not disturb a lower court's sentencing
determination.38
1980) ("The justification for this policy [of broad judicial inquiry in indeterminate
sentencing] is the strong public interest in imposing sentences based upon a complete
evaluation of each individual offender and designed to aid in his particular rehabilitation.").
33. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("Justice generally
requires consideration of . .. the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender."); McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263,
271, 182 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1971) ("It is essential that a sentencing court consider the
nature of the particular crime .. . and the personality of the criminal."); Von
Hirsch, supra note 30, at 247 ("An often-repeated theme in the literature has been
that the offender's disposition should be decided by 'balancing' the different aims of
punishment ....");Wechsler, CorrectionalPracticesand the Law, 17 FED. PROBATION 16, 17-18 (1953). But see Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 247 ("When the
different objectives are in conflict, however, saying they should be 'balanced' against
each other does not offer a principled way of resolving the issue. One escapes this
difficulty by giving the commensurate-deserts principle prima-facie controlling effect.").
34. R.

SINGER,

JUST DESERTS:

SENTENCING

BASED ON

EQUALITY

AND DESERT

28

(1979) ("The indeterminate sentence is, by definition, not concerned with the offense
but with the offender; any relation of the actual sentence to the severity of the offense
should be totally coincidental"). See text accompanying note 133 infra.
35. ABA Statement Concerning Bail, Sentencing and Corrections, submitted to
the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime 5 (1981). In urging the legislative establishment of Sentencing Guideline Drafting Agencies which would be empowered to promulgate presumptively appropriate sentencing ranges within statutory limits, the ABA stated: "we feel that sentencing guidelines should seek to reflect
the current community consensus about the relative gravity of offenses." Id.
36. See generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, §§ 41-68 (1978 & Supp. 1982)
(constitutional considerations). The United States Supreme Court has never held that
"the full panoply of constitutional rights" applies to the sentencing process. Perry, 36
N.Y.2d at 119, 324 N.E.2d at 880, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
37. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, § 69 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
38. The general rule is that a federal appellate court will not review a sentence
imposed within statutory limits. See, e.g., Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447; Note, Appellate
Review of Sentences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357,
1357 [hereinafter cited as Note, Appellate Review]. A few state courts allow appel-
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A. Due Process
The preservation of a defendant's procedural due process rights is
less clearly defined at sentencing than at trial, 39 because the rules of
evidence need not be followed during sentencing. 40 A judge may
consider a broad range of information regarding "the convicted
person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral
propensities" 4 I and any other information it requires, 42 even though
the information is obtained outside the courtroom from individuals
late review of sentencing. Note, An Excessively Long Sentence Constitutes Cruel and
Unusual Punishment-Davis v. Davis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 821, 825 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Excessively Long Sentence]. In New York, an intermediate
appellate court may modify a judgment upon a determination that a sentence imposed is illegal, unduly harsh or severe. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.15(2)(c)
(McKinney 1971). See also Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion:A Method of
Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 492 (1976)("New York is one of the
jurisdictions which entertains appeals by convicted criminal defendants attacking the
sentence itself.").
Some circuit courts circumvent the rule against appellate review. The Second
Circuit, for example, uses two rationales to vacate excessively harsh sentences: that
some aspect of the sentencing procedure violated due process, and that the trial judge
abused his discretion. Comment, Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences-The
Backdoor Approach, 44 BROOKLYN L.REv. 975, 979-80 (1978). The Fifth Circuit has
stated that while it will not review the severity of a sentence within statutory limits,
it will carefully scrutinize the "judicial process" by which punishment was imposed.
See, e.g., United States v. Cimino, 659 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Clements, 634 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1981); Herron v. United States, 551 F.2d
62, 64 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1976).
Because a district court judge is not required to state the reasons for imposing a
particular sentence, it may be difficult to maintain an effective challenge to a
sentence. The Second Circuit has recognized the benefit of stating the reasons on the
record, though such statement is not constitutionally required. United States v.
Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973).
Because indeterminate sentencing often results in great disparities in sentences, the
general rule of non-reviewability of sentencing decisions has come under increasing
attack. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT ORDER 75-85
(1973); Burr, Appellate Review As a Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing
Discretion-A Workable Alternative? 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1971); Coburn,
Disparityin Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 207,
216-19 (1971); DeCosta, Disparity and Inequality of Criminal Sentences: Constitutional and Legislative Approaches to Appellate Review and Reallocation of the
Sentencing Function, 14 How. L.J. 29, 39-51 (1968); Frankel, supra note 24, at 2328; Hopkins, supra, at 491-92; Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be
Appellate Review? 41 A.B.A. J. 13, 16-17 (1955); Comment, supra, at 977-78; Note,
Appellate Review, supra, at 1357; Casenote, United States v. Grayson, Questionable
Support for Broad Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc.
407, 424-45 (1979). For data on state-to-state disparities in prison sentences, see Huge
Disparitiesin Jail Time, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
39. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, § 41, at 150-51 (1978).
40. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
41. Id. at 245.
42. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
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whom the defendant has not been allowed to confront or
cross-examine. 43 However, if the information relied upon in
sentencing is materially untrue, the Supreme Court has held such
44
reliance to be in violation of a defendant's right to due process.
Consideration of public opinion by a sentencing judge 45 may
endanger a defendant's due process rights if such opinion represents an
aggravating factor which the defendant has no opportunity to deny or
explain. 46 It could be argued that due process demands would be met
if the defendant were provided an opportunity to rebut such public
opinion. 47 This solution is simplistic, however, unless differentiations
48
are made among the many forms that public opinion may take.
43. Williams, 337 U.S. at 245. In response to the need of the sentencing judge for
information regarding the background, character and conduct of the convicted
defendant, Congress has enacted legislation that specifies that: "[n]o limitation shall
be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of
a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1976); see also United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-37 (W.D. Wash.
1980) (Congress enacted legislation codifying judge's authority to conduct broad
inquiry). The probation service of the court assists the sentencing judge by preparing
a presentence investigation report which contains the defendant's prior criminal
record, information about his characteristics, financial condition and the citcumstances affecting his behavior and such other information as may be required by the
court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). Presentence reports required by state law are
usually similar. See, e.g., N.Y. Cuam. PRoc. LAW § 390.30(1), (3) (McKinney 1971).
See text accompanying note 233 infra for amendment of § 390.30(3) regarding victim
impact statement, effective Nov. 1, 1982.
44. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972) (remand for resentencing
affirmed because sentence of defendant convicted for bank robbery was based on
previous convictions which were constitutionally invalid); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (conviction for burglary and armed robbery reversed because
uncounseled defendant was prejudiced by misinformation concerning prior record).
45. While it is often stated that public sentiment is an improper factor to be
examined in sentencing, see, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 839,
354 N.E.2d 18, 24 (App. Ct. 1976); State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 15, 444 A.2d 569,
574 (1982), some commentators express the contrary view. Burr, supra note 38, at 10;
Wechsler, supra note 33, at 18.
46. In the context of a non-capital crime, the New York Court of Appeals has
ruled that the key to due process in all sentencing "is whether the defendant has been
afforded an opportunity to refute those aggravating factors which may have negatively influenced the court." People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 324 N.E.2d 878,
880, 365 N.Y.S.2d 518, 521 (1975). A defendant is denied due process when the death
sentence is imposed on the basis of information which he has had no opportunity to
deny or explain. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
47. New York has recently amended the statute regarding the purposes of the
penal law "to provide for an appropriate public response to particular offenses,
including consideration of the consequences ... for the victim ... and the community." See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). If such information were presented at a sentencing hearing, presumably, the defendant would have
an opportunity to rebut any information he contests. The court may hold presentence
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In Moore v. Dempsey,49 the Supreme Court held that a guilty
verdict resulting from a trial dominated by "mob rule," where
"counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible
wave of public passion," was invalid for noncompliance with due
process of law. 50 In recent cases, community sentiment has been
manifested more subtly, so that no due process violation has been
found.

conferences to resolve any discrepancies in information received or to assist the court
in consideration of any relevant matter. N.Y. CrM. PROC. LAW § 400.10 (1) (McKinney 1971). The court may advise anyone present of the factual contents of any report
or memorandum and "afford any participant an opportunity to controvert or to
comment on any fact." Id. § (3). New York also amended the statute regarding the
scope of the presentence report to include, when relevant to the recommendation or
court disposition, a victim impact statement. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3)
(McKINNEY SuPP. 1982-1983). The sentencing court ma in its discretion either make
the presentence report available to the defendant or withhold disclosure of all or part
of it. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d at 120, 324 N.E.2d at 881, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The court
may withhold disclosure when the information is not relevant to a proper sentence;
when it is diagnostic in nature and might disrupt a program of rehabilitation; when
the information has been obtained on a promise of confidentiality; or when disclosure would not be in the interest of justice. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.50(2)
(McKinney 1981). Although the inclusion of a victim impact statement is premised on
its relevancy to sentencing, id. § 390.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), it would
appear that if the victim supplied information on a promise of confidentiality or
disclosure was not in the interest of justice, a defendant would have the opportunity
to see the information in the presentence report and have the opportunity to rebut it.
At the federal level, a court will permit a deteno.a;t, upon request, to read the
presentence report but may withhold disclosure of information which might disrupt
a program of rehabilitation or result in harm to the defendant or others, or which
was obtained by a promise of confidentiality. FED. R. CrM. P. 32(c)(3). See text
accompanying note 235 infra for a discussion of victim impact information in federal
presentence reports. Once a defendant is given access to the report, the Second
Circuit has held that the defendant must be given adequate time to prepare a
rebuttal to any inaccuracies contained therein. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775,
780 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Appellate Review, supra note 38, at 1371-74;
Note, supra note 23, at 835-41, for a discussion urging disclosure of presentence
reports as a matter of due process and policy.
48. For example, mob domination of a trial and sentencing blatantly violates a
defendant's right to due process of law. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91
(1923). The propriety of judicial consideration of other forms of public opinion, such
as witness testimony during a sentencing hearing, depends on the circumstances. See
text accompanying notes 145-46 infra. The submission of letters or petitions to a
sentencing judge are other prerogatives of the public, though a judge may decide not
to read the submitted material. See text accompanying notes 148-49 infra. An indirect mode of expressing public opinion is exemplified in the court observer movement. See text accompanying notes 162-72 infra. Recognizable segments of the
public, such as the elderly, make their presence felt in an effort to remind the judge
that they are the potential victims of a particular type of crime. See text accompanying notes 168-70 infra.
49. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
50. Id. at 91. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing before the
district court to determine whether the alleged facts were true and whether they
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A New Jersey trial court has taken judicial notice of a community's
anxiety over a defendant's "drug involvement" because he was a
school teacher. 51 The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the
conviction but disapproved of the trial court's reference to community
anxiety. The court referred to the rule against mob domination, and
stated that "[w]hether this 'public anxiety' arose from a general
apprehension about drug abuse ... or from the focused outrage over
this school teacher's misconduct, such factors should not have
influenced the trial judge's deliberations. ' 52 The trial judge's decision
was upheld, however, because it was "fundamentally founded upon
an evaluation of the whole person of the defendant, not on the
community's viewpoint." 53 Thus, the court found no violation of due
process.

54

could be sufficiently explained so as to leave the state proceeding undisturbed. Id. at
92.
The appellants were five blacks who were convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Id. at 87. They were accused
of killing a white male based on facts showing that a group of white males attacked a
group of black people assembled in church. Id.The trial lasted 45 minutes and the
jury brought in their guilty verdict in less than five minutes. Id. at 89. According to
affidavits, "no juryman could have voted for an acquittal and continued to live in
Phillips County, and if any prisoner by any chance had been acquitted by a jury he
could not have escaped the mob." Id. at 89-90.
51. State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 8-9, 444 A.2d 569, 571 (1982) (defendant
pleaded guilty of possessing marijuana).
52. Id. at 15, 444 A.2d at 574. "Judicial recognition of or action upon public
opinion against a particular defendant cannot be tolerated in our criminal justice
system." Id.
53. Id.
54. However, the dissent noted that although the majority conceded "that the trial
court's decision was in part premised on the inappropriate factor of hostile public
opinion," it ignored this transgression by deferring to its disposition. Id. at 18, 444
A.2d at 576 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed the view that "reliance
on public pressure .. .was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 17, 444 A.2d 575
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
An interesting due process problem is evidenced by a Texas rule of criminal
procedure which prohibits the prosecution from informing the jury that the community wants an accused convicted. See Crawford v. State, 511 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974); Bothwell v. State, 500 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);
Perbetsky v. State, 429 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). Though one
prosecutor argued that "some of the people of McLennan County are wanting Juries
to get tough with some of these defendants and to let them know that the people of
McLennan County don't appreciate all of this crime that has been going on in the
county," Crawford, 511 S.W.2d at 16-17, the appellate court held that the rule was
not violated because the prosecutor did not say what the whole community wished
about this particular defendant. Id. at 17. In another case, the prosecutor stated to
the jury that "[s]ociety demands that the Defendant be punished." Perbetsky, 429
S.W.2d at 475 (conviction of defendant of rape of a 59-year old woman by force,
threats and fraud affirmed). In affirming the conviction, the appellate court found
that the prosecutor's statement did not violate the rule but was merely "a plea for law
enforcement." Id. Although these statements seem to exemplify the type of prosecutorial misconduct that the rule was meant to prohibit, they were held not to be

1982]

SENTENCING JUDGES

273

At the opposite end of the spectrum from mob rule is the solicitation
of public opinion by the judiciary. In an Illinois case, a trial judge
sought discussion regarding the punishment to be imposed with other
judges and members of the public5 5 to determine "whether a sentence
of probation or conditional discharge would 'deprecate the
seriousness' of the offense."-5 6 Although the Appellate Court of Illinois
conceded that "[a]n argument can be made that the best way to do
this is to talk to others to sample public opinion," 5 7 the court held that
private conversations with members of the public were improper and
remanded for resentencing 5 8 The court's major objection to this
procedure was that it deprived the defendant of the opportunity to
challenge the bias of the information obtained.59 Presumably, if the
defendant had been given such an opportunity, the appellate court
would not have objected.6 0
A judge may become aware of public sentiment in sentencing
without necessarily violating due process. The foregoing cases
illustrate that although mob domination of a trial and sentencing
clearly violates due process, the mere consideration of community
sentiment by a sentencing judge may be acceptable where: (1) the
sentence is fundamentally founded upon a complete evaluation of the
defendant rather than the community's viewpoint, and (2) a
defendant is given an opportunity to challenge any biased community
sentiment or opinion regarding sentencing.'

violative of the rule or of due process. Examples of arguments by the prosecutor
which were found to offend the rule were: "[t]he people of DeSoto are asking the jury
to convict this defendant," Crawford, 511 S.W.2d at 17, "[t]he people of Nueces
County expect you to put the man away," id. These statements specified that the
particular community as a whole wanted a conviction. Id.
55. People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 354 N.E.2d 18 (App. Ct. 1976).
56. Id. at 839, 354 N.E.2d at 24.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976) ("a
defendant must be given adequate time to prepare and present a rebuttal to information which he contests").
60. Contra People v. Short, 66 Ill. App. 3d 172, 383 N.E.2d 723 (App. Ct. 1978).
"Although the [Sumner] court's major objection to this procedure was that it deprived the defendant of an opportunity to challenge the bias of the information
obtained, we believe such evidence is incompetent even if elicited during the sentencing hearing itself." Id. at 181, 383 N.E.2d at 730.
61. Judicial awareness of community sentiment regarding the gravity of a particular offense may prevent a court's trivialization of the offense, in accordance with the
theory of commensurate deserts. Von Hirsch supra note 30, at 243-55. In State v.
Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1970), the Supreme Court of Alaska castigated the trial court for its lenient sentencing of a defendant who, with a companion,
beat, raped and robbed the victim. Id. at 445. The court found that the sentence
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B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Another constitutional limitation on judicial discretion in
sentencing is that a sentence may not violate the eighth amendment
proscription against "cruel and unusual punishment". 62 The Supreme
Court has held that "cruel and unusual punishment" exists when a
sentence "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people."6' 3
Inherent in this test is the principle that the punishment must be
acceptable to contemporary society.6 4 A criticism of the contemporary
standards test is that "it shifts the moral responsibility for a sentence
from the consciences of the judges to the 'common conscience' "65 and
that "such a standard-the community's attitude-is usually an
unknowable. ' 66 The Second Circuit envisioned cases where the
general public's sentiment might be knowable, but concluded that,
generally, such sentiment resembles a "slithery shadow. ' 67 Given
today's extensive use of the media as a means of communication and
dialogue,6 8 the prevalence of public opinion polls on a variety of

imposed did not achieve the objective of reformation of the accused, nor did the
sentence effectuate "the goal of community condemnation, or the reaffirmation of
societal norms." Id. at 447. The court stated that the leniency of the "sentence
imposed could lead to the conclusion that forcible rape and robbery are not reflective
of serious antisocial conduct." Id.
62. Originally, "cruel and unusual punishment" was interpreted as a prohibition
against barbarous methods of punishment or execution. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 170 (1976).
63. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (per curiam) (imposition and
execution of death penalty in these cases held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth and fourteenth amendments) (Marshall, J., concurring)(citing United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
3,4 U.S. 838 (1952)).
64. Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The cruel and
unusual language "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 329 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Though "the first indicator of the public's attitude must always
be found in the legislative judgments of the people's chosen representatives," id. at
437 (Powell, J., dissenting), legislative authorization does not establish acceptance.
Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). The court must determine whether contemporary society considers a challenged punishment which is available by statute to be
acceptable in its particular use. Id. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
65. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 838 (1952) (defendants' conviction of conspiracy to violate Espionage Act by
communicating secret information to Russia affirmed and sentence of death not
"cruel and unusual punishment").
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See note 174 infra and accompanying text.
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issues 69 and the many ways in which public opinion is expressed, 70 this
assumption is probably no longer valid.
General public opinion often parallels the opinions of those who
have an interest in particular sentencing decisions-the victims of
crimes. 71 This segment of the population has been traditionally
ignored by legislators. 72 If the hallmark of a cruel and unusual
73
punishment is a sentence which is disproportionate to the offense,

69. "[P]ublic opinion poll[s] obviously [are] of some assistance in indicating public
acceptance or rejection of a specific penalty." Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall stated that the utility of such polls depends on the
citizenry being "informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities." Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 129-72 infra. Even if some segments of the
population are silent, it may be due to lack of exposure. As stated by Justice Marshall:
Lack of exposure to the problem is likely to lead to indifference, and
indifference and ignorance result in preservation of the status quo,
whether or not that is desirable, or desired.
• ..It is therefore imperative for constitutional purposes to attempt to
discern the probable opinion of an informed electorate.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 362 n.145 (Marshall, J., concurring). This "probable opinion"
was not expected to be based on strictly rational precepts. "[A] violation of the
Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective, emotional
reactions of informed citizens." Id. at 362 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71. In Aldoupolis, discussed at text accompanying notes 1-14 supra, for example,
90% of the phone calls to Governor King were from women. Los Angeles Times,
Nov. 27, 1981, at 22, col. 2. During the proceedings of a New York case involving the
robbery of an elderly woman, senior citizens were organized into court watching
groups, one function of which was to remind the judge that elderly people were
routine targets for muggings in the Bronx. See text accompanying notes 164-70 infra
for a discussion of this effort.
72. Victim Witness Assistance Project, Victim Witness Legislation: Consideration
for Policymakers, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. CrUM. JUST. viii [hereinafter cited as Victim/
Witness]. It is only recently that some state legislatures have decided to include
victims in the statutory scheme by either mandating that victims be provided with
information on the proceedings or that the impact on their lives be included in the
presentence report. See text accompanying notes 229-34 infra.
73. "[The Clause] is directed... against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged," Furman, 408
U.S. at 279-80 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)). This "disproportionality" test was later adopted by the Supreme Court
in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), where it was held that an
excessive punishment, disproportionate to the crime committed, is cruel and unusual.
Though the legislature has the primary responsibility for determining the proportionality relationship, it is subject to judicial review. "The limitations of proportionality
are constitutional ones, and 'what those are, the judiciary must decide.' " Note,
Excessively Long Sentence, supra note 38, at 823-24 (quoting Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910)). Generally, when a statute provides for a disproportionate punishment, the statute itself, and not the length of sentence can be attacked.
Id. at 824. This principle adheres to the general rule against appellate review of
statutory sentences. See note 38 supra. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
represents the minority position in holding that a statutory sentence of imprisonment
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then community sentiment concerning the actual or potential
experience of being "offended ' 74 is highly relevant. A
can be reviewed for a disproportionately excessive length of sentence. Note, Excessively Long Sentence, supra note 38, at 830 (citing Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288
(6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 432 U.S. 933 (1975); Hemans v. United States,
163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947)).
The Fourth Circuit also has held that a statutory sentence of imprisonment was
cruel and unusual because of its excessive length. The judgment was vacated and the
case remanded for further consideration, however, in light of Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980). Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 445

U.S. 947 (1980).
In Rummel, the Supreme Court held that a mandatory life sentence imposed on
the defendant pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. The defendant had committed three felonies over a nine year
period for fraudulently presenting a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods,
passing a forged instrument for $28.36 and obtaining $120.75 by false pretense. The
Court reached its holding "[b]y downplaying the applicability of the proportionality
doctrine for assessing lengths of sentences, and giving the utmost respect to the
principle of federalism." Gardner, supra note 25, at 1125. Thus, at least one commentator believes that while the Rummel Court "did not wholly reject the eighth
amendment proportionality doctrine, [it] did severely restrict its applicability to
cases challenging the length of sentences." Id.However, the Court may have curtailed the application of the proportionality doctrine to cases involving recidivist
statutes only, thereby leaving "courts free to apply the eighth amendment .. .to
excessive punishment of a single offense." Id. at 1128.
74. Judicial knowledge of community sentiment in regard to the seriousness of
particular types of crimes, see ABA Statement Concerning Bail, Sentencing and
Corrections, submitted to the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime 5
(1981) ("we feel that sentencing guidelines should seek to reflect the current community consensus about the relative gravity of offenses"), need not lead to being swayed
by public clamor. In an Illinois case, People v. Short, 66 Ill. App. 3d 172, 383 N.E.2d
723 (App. Ct. 1978), a state attorney questioned prominent members of the community and the victims during the sentencing hearing, as to whether they thought "that
the granting of probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense involved."
Id. at 180, 383 N.E.2d at 730. The defendants, two high school seniors, were charged
with burglary, arson and criminal damage to property. They broke into a week-end
home, began "playing around" with matches and lighter fluid, causing extensive
damage to the house in the resulting fire. Id. at 173, 383 N.E.2d at 725. In affirming
the convictions and remanding for resentencing, id. at 181, 383 N.E.2d at 730, the
appellate court held that this practice was improper because the trial court must
ultimately decide this issue after hearing testimony regarding facts surrounding the
offense and the characteristics of the defendants. Id. at 180, 383 N.E.2d at 730
(citing ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 5.3 (1974)
("the prosecutor, no less than the judge, has the duty to resist public clamor or
improper pressure of any sort")). The individuals who testified were the Chief
Deputy Sheriff, the chief of the fire department and his assistant and the owners of
the damaged house. The well-reasoned opinions of these individuals, all connected to
the case, hardly seems to qualify as "public clamor." See Short, 66 Ill. App. 3d at
177-80, 383 N.E.2d at 727-29. Paradoxically, the trial judge had imposed a much
harsher sentence than was advocated by some of the chief witnesses at the sentencing
hearing. The trial judge had sentenced defendants to the maximum term allowable
of one to three years and imposed a fine of $1000 per defendant. Id. at 174, 383
N.E.2d at 725. The chief of the fire department had advocated a light sentence of 30
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disproportionately lenient punishment may imply that the victim 7who
5
is terrorized, beaten and robbed is not worthy of much concern.
In a recent New York case, 76 the sentencing judge noted his

awareness of public opinion7 7 yet proceeded to deliberate with care
before imposing sentence on the defendant. 78 The court held that to
follow the mandatory sentencing statute would result in the
imposition of a "cruel and unusual punishment. ' 79 In noting that one
of the goals of punishment is "to make whole those who have suffered
loss as a result of criminal activity," 80 the court recognized the
suffering of the victim and the public in regard to the crime of selling
drugs. Nevertheless, in declining to follow the statute, the court stated
that the New York drug laws were "Draconian" 8' as applied to this
days served on the weekends in the county jail and the assistant fire chief advocated a
sentence of 60 days on weekends. Id. at 179, 383 N.E.2d at 728. The victims had
advocated a "full sentence" and "full restitution." Id. at 179-80, 383 N.E.2d at 729.
Given these facts, it can hardly be said that the judge was swept along by the pressure
of public outcry.
75. See Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 246 ("disproportionately lenient punishment
for murder implies that human life-the victim's life-is not worthy of much concern. ..").
76. People v. Vincent, N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1982, at 19, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County June 25, 1982).
77. Justice Hentel of the Trial Term stated:
Today, many voices are raised demanding security and surcease from
proliferating crime problems. Most solutions proposed are simplistic in
nature-tougher judges, harsher laws, and Draconian penalties....
"Lock 'em up and throw away the key" is easy to shout these days based on
fear and emotion rather than practicality, but not always easy to do in a
particular case .... And all cases must be judged on their facts and
merits.
A Society through its laws cannot be that cruel, or hardened or insensitive to the good possibilities which may exist for non-violent, one time
criminals who are just as much the victims of their own crimes and
illnesses as is society. To continue seeking "a pound of flesh" in retribution
in every case will-nilly . . .[has] been proven by history to be senseless.
Id., at 19, col. 5.
78. Id., at 20, col. 1.
79. Id. The defendant, 22 years old, was charged with third degree Criminal Sale
of a Controlled Substance (he sold four grains of heroin to an undercover police
officer for $30.00) pursuant to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 229.39 (McKinney 1980). Sentencing had been adjourned several times. During this period, defendant was enrolled in
a drug treatment program and maintained a steady employment history. As a result,
the defendant was granted probation provided he continued drug treatment, remained drug-free and maintained steady employment. The court reasoned that
although the mandatory sentencing statute was not unconstitutional per se, mandatory sentencing in this case would be unduly harsh and would have no discernible
benefit. Thus, this case represented the "rare case" where the following of a sentencing statute would result in a "cruel and unusual punishment." Vincent, N.Y.L.J.,
July 12, 1982, at 19, col. 6; 20, col. 1.
80. Vincent, N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1982, at 19, col. 5.
81. Id.
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particular defendant. 8 2 This case illustrates that judicial awareness
does not necessarily lead to subservience to public opinion. Rather,
knowledge of what "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the
people"8 3 is valuable in imposing a proportionate sentence, the
concept of proportionality being central to any analysis of "cruel and
84
unusual" punishment.
C. Equal Protection
Implicit in the "cruel and unusual" punishment theme is the
guarantee of equal protection.8 5 "A penalty . . . should be considered
,unusually' imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or
discriminatorily. '' 86 The "cruel and unusual punishment" clause
"require[s] legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed,
non-selective and nonarbitrary and require[s] judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively and spottily to
unpopular groups. "87
Courts have held uniformly that equal protection principles are not
necessarily violated by the imposition of a different sentence on two
offenders, each convicted for the same offense. 88 Disparate sentencing
may constitutionally result when the characteristics of each individual
offender are completely evaluated and taken into account. Such

82. Id., at 19, col. 6; 20, col. 1. In arriving at the sentencing decision, the trial
judge mentioned principles of law previously discussed at notes 33 & 73 supra: that
the defendant is "worthy of having a sentence fashioned for him which will not only
fit his crime, but also fit him as the individual to be sentenced," Vincent, N.Y.L.J.,
July 12, 1982, at 19, col. 4, and whether a punishment is excessive is determined by
whether it is "so severe as to be ... disproportionate to the crime," id., col. 6.
Excessiveness was also to be determined by whether the punishment "serve[d] no
penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment." Id.
83. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
84. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("a sentence may be called 'erroneous' if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime committed. But in that event, the sentence is 'cruel and unusual' in
violation of the Eighth Amendment").
Even given the most extreme point of view that the "Rummel Court paid lip
service to the [eighth amendment] proportionality doctrine, [but] effectively abandoned it" for non-capital cases, see Gardner, supra note 25, at 1133; note 73 supra,
federal courts may still be inclined to utilize it because they are not restrained by the
concerns of federalism; state courts may limit the Rummel holding to recidivist
offender statutes; and state courts are free to follow the doctrine under state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See Gardner, supra note
25, at 1137.
85. Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 256.
88. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 25, § 45, at 163.
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characteristics include a defendant's prior record, personal
characteristics and degree of culpability.89 While these bases for
disparity in sentences for defendants convicted of the same offense are
valid, disparate sentences based on discriminatory factors such as
race, sex or economic status, are not. Yet, "[t]he crazy quilt of
disparities-the wide differences in treatment of defendants whose
situations and crimes look similar and whose divergent sentences are
unaccounted for-stirs doubts as to whether the guarantee of the
'equal protection of the laws' is being fulfilled." 9 0
If the consideration of public sentiment causes further disparities in
sentencing, then equal protection violations might be exacerbated. 91
89. See State v. Lyman, 26 Conn. Supp. 70, 73, 213 A.2d 73, 74 (Super. Ct.
1965); People v. Corapi, 42 Misc. 2d 247, 252, 247 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614 (App. Term 1st
Dep't 1964); McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 182 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1971).
90. M. FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 103. The Supreme Court found that the death
sentence, for example, was "disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor,
the Negro and the members of unpopular groups," Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-50
(Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143
(1967)), and that discriminatory application of any penalty would violate the equal
protection theme implicit in the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause. Id. at 245
(Douglas, J., concurring). The Court also stated that it could not find any instances
of execution of "any member of the affluent strata of this society." Id. at 251-52. For
a discussion of sentencing of the "white-collar" criminal, see generally L. FoRu,
supra note 20, at 194-208 (white-collar crime); Pelaez, Of Crime-And Punishment:
Sentencing the White-Collar Criminal, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 823 (1980). For data supporting the view that "white-collar offenders benefit from relatively lenient treatment," see Hagan & Nagel, White-Collar Crime, White-Collar Time: The Sentencing of White-CollarOffenders in the Southern Districtof New York, 20 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 259, 278 (1982).
Although discrimination on the basis of sex was not found to violate the equal
protection clause in the past where, for example, a longer prison term was imposed
on a female than upon a male committing the same crime, Ex rel. Gosselin, 141 Me.
412, 44 A.2d 882, appeal dismissed, 328 U.S. 817 (1945), discrimination in sentencing on the basis of sex has been found to violate equal protection. See State v.
Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973) (statute requiring females to receive
indeterminate sentencing where males would not violated equal protection principles); see also Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974) (statute
proscribing minimum sentences only for female offenders violates both federal and
state equal protection clauses); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400
(1968) (proscription of indeterminate sentencing for women held unreasonable and
unrelated to any rational sentencing objective). Cf. Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62
(Me.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970) (legislature could logically and reasonably
conclude that a more severe penalty should be imposed upon a male prisoner escaping from the state prison than upon a woman confined at the reformatory).
91. This might occur, for example, if defendants were "sentenced according to the
vacillations of the judge in response to the ever-changing popular feeling concerning
crime," Burr, supra note 38, at 4 (quoting W. MORSE & R. BEATTIE, SURVEY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OREGON 164 (1932)), and the "popular
feeling" was based on racial discrimination.
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The opposite hypothesis might be better founded, however, in that
consideration of popular feeling in regard to the seriousness of
particular offenses could serve to decrease sentence disparity in a
given region . 2 In Aldoupolis,9 3 for example, the trial judge considered
as mitigating factors that the defendants were all first offenders and
were from "very close, supportive families," when he suspended their
three-to-five year prison sentences and placed them on probation. 4 In
another recent Massachusetts case, three doctors were convicted of
raping a nurse and were sentenced to three-to-five years in prison,
with all but six months suspended. 5 The divergent sentences seem
unaccounted for, especially as the facts of the Aldoupolis case involve
even greater brutality and warrant a more serious punishment.
Consideration of the community consensus on the relative gravity of
the crime16 of rape might have resulted in more rational and just
sentencing determinations in these two cases. 97
D. Double Jeopardy
A principal aim of the double jeopardy prohibition is to prevent the
government, "with all its resources and power [from making] re92. Public sentiment regarding the relative gravity of offenses might counteract
the disparity which results when "different judges give different sentences to different defendants" convicted of the same crime, because of the "real flaws: the discrepancies between judges, boroughs [and] races." N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1982, at 24, col.
3-4 (letter from Florynce Kennedy, Esq.).
Public consensus on a national level might help to eradicate disproportions in
sentencing which occur on the state level as exemplified in State v. Trowbridge, 95
Idaho 640, 516 P.2d 362 (1973), wherein defendant was sentenced to a five-year term
of imprisonment for stealing four calves in Idaho, and Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth,
386 Mass. 260, 435 N.E.2d 330 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1982) (nos. 82-203 & 82-5159), wherein the three-to-five year prison terms imposed
on defendants who raped, sodomized, assaulted, and destroyed the car of a woman
in Massachusetts, were initially suspended.
93. 386 Mass. 260, 435 N.E.2d 330 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1982) (nos. 82-203 & 82-5159), discussed at notes 1-14 supra.
94. Commonwealth v. Tarr, No. 76300-324, at 2-4 (Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1981).
95. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982).
96. See note 35 supra.
97.
Public outcry, particularly by oppressed groups, [such as the poor, the
elderly, minorities and women] can have a corrective influence on the
criminal justice system. Power built the "road." Most public opinion will
follow the "road." But when oppressed groups use it [i.e., express their
opinions and sentiments], they can prevent justice from going too far off
the "road." For example, consider the old nursery rhyme modified to
reflect modern bigotry: "eeny, meany, miny, mo; catch a nigger by the
toe; if he hollers, let him go." We didn't holler loud enough.
Interview with Florynce Kennedy, Esq., in New York City (August 2, 1982) (attorney, lecturer, coordinator: Black Women United For Political Action).
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peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity
...., Does the double jeopardy protection apply to sentencing?
In Bullington v. Missouri,"' the Supreme Court applied the double
jeopardy prohibition to sentencing. 0 0 The Court held that the state
was precluded from seeking the death penalty at defendant's retrial
because the jury had effectively "acquitted" the defendant of imposition of any harsher sentence' 0' when it fixed his punishment at life
imprisonment after a presentence hearing. 0 2 The Court based its
application of the, double jeopardy prohibition to sentencing, however, on the specific.statutory procedures employed by the Supreme
Court of Missouri.! 0 .The Court determined that the state had already
had "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble,"
'0 4
and was "not entitled to another."'
In the case where a sentencing judge's discretion is essentially unfettered, would a judge's consideration of public opinion after a sentence
has been imposed lead to a violation of the double jeopardy prohibition? In Sonnier v. State, 05 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a
trial judge violated the prohibition when he increased a sentence
pronounced only a few hours earlier, solely because the victim's husband complained that the original sentence was too lenient. 00 Even

98. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
99. 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (defendant convicted of capital murder).
100. Id. at 446.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 445.
103. Missouri law provides only two possible sentences for a defendant convicted
of capital murder: death or life imprisonment. Id. at 432 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §
565.008.1 (1978)). A presentence hearing is held before the same jury that found the
defendant guilty. Evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation is heard. The
jury's decision must be unanimous for the death penalty to be imposed; otherwise life
imprisonment is imposed. Id. at 433-35.
104. Id. at 446 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1977)). The
presentence hearing in Bullington resembled a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 438-39. In making the sentencing determination, the jury had to utilize "the
reasonable-doubt standard of the Missouri statute." Id. at 441. The jury, by statute,
had only two alternatives, whereas in most cases, the sentencing judge's discretion is
essentially unfettered. Id. at 439. Thus, in the usual case, it is impossible to conclude
that a sentence less than the statutory maximum represents a determination that the
government has failed to prove its case. Id. at 443.
105. 483 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1971) (defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and assault
with intent to kill).
106. Id. at 1004. In Sonnier, the trial judge had been sufficiently impressed with
the complaint of the victim's husband to the effect that the sentence was too lenient,
that he risked increasing the sentence. Id. The original sentence imposed was five
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though the increased sentence was still within statutory limits, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that once a sentence is meaningfully
imposed, it may not be increased at a later time. 10 7 The court stated
that "one of the great purposes of the double jeopardy clause is to
prevent popular pressures from operating to the detriment of the
accused after he has once been sentenced."'' 0 8
In Aldoupolis, by contrast, the trial judge relied on a Massachusetts
statute in revoking the suspension of the sentences. 0 9 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the judge had authority to
revise the sentences and that such action did not violate double jeopardy principles. 1 0 Consequently, the court held that "[t]he defendants
should not have had an expectation of finality in their sentences in the
face of this rule.""'
years on each count to run concurrently with eligibility for parole at the parole
board's discretion. The sentence subsequently imposed was 10 years on each count to
run concurrently with the possibility of parole after three years and four months. Id.
at 1003-04. The judge stated that he had made a mistake at the first sentencing, was
relying on "certain plenary power" to correct his mistake and that although defendant might have grounds for an appeal, he "was not going to alter [his] action." Id. at
1004.
107. Id. at 1005.
108. Id.
109. MAss. ANN. LAWS, R. CmuM. P. 29 (Law. Co-op. 1979) provides that "[t]he
trial judge upon his own motion or the written motion of a defendant filed within
sixty days after the imposition of a sentence . . .may, upon such terms and conditions as he shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not
have been done." Public opinion was not named as the reason for the trial judge's
revocation of the suspension of sentence either by the trial judge or by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, see note 10 supra and accompanying text, though
defense counsel argued that the judge had succumbed to public and political pressure. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
110. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 268, 435 N.E.2d at 334. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts relied on United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980),
in holding that the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment was not
violated. The Massachusetts court determined that the defendants were not cumulatively sentenced to a greater term than proscribed by the legislature and that defendant's commencement of probation also did not violate double jeopardy. Aldoupolis,
386 Mass. at 273-74, 435 N.E.2d at 337.
111. Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 274, 435 N.E.2d at 338. Double jeopardy is also not
at issue where criticism by the public or press of a judge's proposed sentence is
instrumental to a change in the sentence ultimately imposed. In a New York case,
People v. Wright, 104 Misc. 2d 911, 429 N.Y.S.2d 993, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980),
a judge's proposed sentence was criticized by the press before the final sentencing
determination was made. Id. at 913, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 996. The court rejected
defendant's contention that the government had "exerted unethical pressure on the
court by exposing defendant's case and background to the news media," id. at 914,
429 N.Y.S.2d at 996, which allegedly persuaded the sentencing judge to reconsider a
promise made to defendant during plea bargaining. The court found that the new
information unearthed during the sentencing hearing amply justified the sentencing
judge's change of position. Id. at 915, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 997. The Wright court also
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Sonnier and Aldoupolis indicate that the issue of whether the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is violated when a judge
increases a criminal sentence after exposure to extrajudicial pressure
depends on the circumstances and the applicable state law.
E. Abuse of Discretion
The wide discretion exercised by judges in imposing sentences dates
back to English Common Law. 1 2 As one circuit court has stated,
absent a showing of arbitrary or capricious action amounting to a
gross abuse of discretion," 3 "a federal district judge has wide discrerecognized the educative value of the expression of public sentiment concerning a
particular case, in that the court stated: "no court should change its determination
solely because what it believes to be an appropriate ruling is criticized by the press,
prosecutor, or public. On the other hand, if criticism is justified it would be equally
improper to stubbornly adhere to an inappropriate ruling solely to manifest judicial
machismo." Id. (citation omitted).
112.
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
imposed within limits fixed by law .... A recent manifestation of the
historical latitude allowed sentencing judges appears in Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule provides for consideration
by federal judges of reports made by probation officers containing information about a convicted defendant ....
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). The "abuse of discretion" doctrine
has been chiefly developed by case law though some of its tenets have been codified,
as for example, in the A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by many states.
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SociEry, HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 3 (1961). See, e.g., N.Y. CODE
JUDIC. COND., reprinted in N.Y. JUD. LAW. app. at 517 (McKinney 1975).
113. "Abuse of discretion" is a broad term which encompasses many meanings.
For instance, failure to exercise discretion was found where a sentence was imposed
on a "mechanical basis." Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir.
1973). The defendant, a 19-year old member of Jehovah's Witnesses, was a conscientious objector who refused to seek that classification or to report for induction into
the United States armed forces. He was convicted of failing to report for induction
and was given a five-year prison sentence. Id. at 140. The Eighth Circuit found that
the trial judge sentenced in a mechanical fashion because he gave all defendants
convicted of refusing induction a five-year term, id. at 143, in disregard of the policy
of "individualizing sentences." Id. at 144 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at
248). The court held that imposing the maximum sentence on this particular defendant was a gross abuse of discretion which "shock[ed] the judicial conscience." Id. at
147. See also United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 937-38 (1st Cir. 1978) (abuse
of discretion found where defendants sentenced in mechanistic fashion which failed
to individualize sentences).
Another definition of "abuse of discretion" is arbitrary or unreasonable judicial
action: "where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court."
Woosley, 478 F.2d at 150 (quoting Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967
(9th Cir. 1942)).
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tion in determining what sentence to impose and such a sentence will
not be questioned on appeal so long as the sentence is within the
statutory limits .... ,"4 Thus, while a judge's discretion in sentencing is broad, such discretion must be exercised soundly."15 Sound
discretion has been described as being "free from partiality, not
swayed by sympathy nor warped by prejudice nor moved by any kind
of influence save alone the overwhelming passion to do that which is
just." 116

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that a "sentence is the product of an
abuse of discretion [when there is] no delineation of any of the factors utilized by the
trial judge in the exercise of discretion." McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182
N.W.2d 512, 522 (1971) (abuse of discretion found in the imposition of indeterminate
sentence of up to nine years without any explanation, on first offender convicted of
forging a check). The statement of reasons for sentencing on the record facilitates the
trial judge's rationale and aids in appellate review. Id. at 282, 182 N.W.2d at 522.
See also State v. Cooper, 87 Wis. 2d 915, 274 N.W.2d 905 (1979) (unpublished
limited precedent opinion, available on LEXIS, States library, WI file) (abuse of
discretion found where defendant was sentenced to 30 years for attempted murder
and 10 years for armed robbery, to run consecutively, without stating reasons on
record; sentence not set aside for that reason alone, however, and court held sentence
not excessive and affirmed). The holding that a judge must state reasons for a
particular sentence is unusual, however, and it is not required on the federal level.
Frankel, supra note 24, at 9. See also United States v. Garcia, 617 F.2d 1176, 1178
(5th Cir. 1980) ("The fact that the trial judge did not announce reasons for the
severity of the sentence [15 years imprisonment followed by special parole term of 20
years for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of federal
statutes] does not constitute an abuse of discretion."). The Second Circuit has stated
that "a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge would be a most salutary
practice," although not formally required. United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139,
1973).
142
(2d Cir.
" Other
examples of abuse of discretion are illustrated by United States v. Small,
636
F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1981) (arbitrary or capricious abuse of discretion not found where
defendant, convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, was given 10-year sentence
based on information received on day before sentencing that he was arrested on
independent charge for importation of marijuana); United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d
775 (2d Cir. 1976) (abuse of discretion found where trial court failed to consider
defendant's objections at sentencing to allegations raised by court, government and
state prosecutors); People v. Short, 66 Ill. App. 3d 172, 383 N.E.2d 723 (App. Ct.
1978) (abuse of discretion found where trial court may have improperly conditioned
imposition of probation on defendants' ability to pay restitution).
114. United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
847 (1979).
115. Exercise of sound discretion "encompasses consideration of all relevant factors such as the nature of the offense, the history and background of the defendant,
and of course the interest and concerns of society, to mention only a few." Woosley v.
United States, 478 F.2d 139, 148 (8th Cir. 1973) (Matthes, C.J., concurring).
116. People v. Beasley, 5 Cal. App. 3d 617, 630, 85 Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (Ct. App.
1970) (abuse of discretion found where judge had decided question of probation long
before he was in possession of relevant facts of probation report). See text accompanying notes 224-28 infra for further discussion of this case.
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If a judge considers community sentiment, will an abuse of discretion be found by an appellate court? In State v. Trowbridge,1 1 7 the
defendant had pleaded guilty to grand larceny and was sentenced to a
five-year prison term. 1 8 The defendant argued on appeal that the
trial judge had been unduly influenced by a presentence report which
noted the existence of strong community feelings in opposition to
granting probation.1 19 The Supreme Court of Idaho determined that
if the sentence was within statutory limits and the decision was based
upon reason, not emotion, an abuse of discretion ordinarily would not
be found. 120 The court held that the trial judge "was [not] swayed
from a thoughtful and conscientious decision by community sentiment." 12 1 Therefore, no abuse of discretion was found and the judg122
ment was affirmed.
Although community sentiment was considered by the Trowbridge
court, his sentencing decision was found to be impartial because he
had carefully considered the characteristics of the defendant and the
circumstances surrounding the offense. 2 3 While Trowbridge illustrates the potential contribution which increased judicial awareness of
community experience and sentiment may make to rational and just
sentencing determinations, it also highlights the potential danger of a
judge being unduly swayed by a powerful economic group. 24 In
117. 95 Idaho 640, 516 P.2d 362 (1973).
118. Id. at 640, 516 P.2d at 362 (defendant stole four calves entrusted to his care
as part of his employment as range rider).
119. See id. at 641, 516 P.2d at 363. While there was no personal animosity
towards him, the community wished to set an example. Id.
120. Id. The court based its holding on the fact that the trial court had considered
all the factors appropriate to sentencing. The trial court considered all the circumstances surrounding the offense, the fact that the defendant was a first offender, his
previous actions and character, whether he could be rehabilitated, whether he would
comply with the terms of probation, if granted, and the interests of society in being
protected from future criminal conduct of defendant. Id.
121. Id. at 642, 516 P.2d at 364.
122. id.
123. See note 120 supra.
124.
No judge fit to be one is likely to be influenced consciously except by
what he sees and hears in court and by what is judicially appropriate for
his deliberations. However, judges are also human, and we know better
than did our forbears how powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how
treacherous the rational process.
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
For a brief discussion of the possibility that the Trowbridge and Aldoupolis judges
were politically motivated, see note 207 infra. Ironically, the Trowbridge defendant
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a nonviolent crime, whereas the
Aldoupolis defendants' prison sentences for a violent crime were initially suspended.
See text accompanying note 5 infra. Community standards were taken into account
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considering public sentiment in the sentencing decision, the line between sound judicial discretion and abuse of discretion may, at times,
be a fine one.

III. Sources of Pressure on a Sentencing Judge:
Public, Press & Political
Public opinion and sentiment may be reflected in the general theories of punishment relied upon by a sentencing judge, such as retribution, community condemnation, rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation. 125 The opinions of certain sectors of the public are
apparent in the organized activities of citizens groups 12 and in the
testimony, letters, petitions, and written recommendations of particular members of the public which are often directed to sentencing
judges. 127 Opinions expressed by the press and by political figures in
regard to particular sentencing decisions represent other potential
28
pressures on a sentencing judge.1
A. Community Condemnation as Public Pressure
The expression of community condemnation is considered by some
legal scholars to be an essential ingredient, 2 9 if not the chief aim, of
punishment. 30 Punishment has been said to be the "conventional
during the initial sentencing proceedings in Trowbridge and may have led to the
harsh sentence. Lack of community consideration in Aldoupolis, on the other hand,
may have contributed to the excessive leniency of the original sentencing decision.
125. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 106. See also United States v. Bergman,
416 F. Supp. 496, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see generally A. CAMPBELL, supra note
25, §§ 4-8 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
126. See text accompanying notes 162-72 infra.
127. See text accompanying notes 145-52 infra.
128. See text accompanying notes 173-220 infra.
129. Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in SENTENCING 23-24 (H.
Gross & A. Von Hirsch eds. 1981). See also United States v. Mattox, 417 F. Supp.
343, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Punishment serves more or less the ends of retribution
and denunciation-making the defendant 'pay' and reaffirming the community's
outrage against the behavior in question.").
In New York, there is a long line of cases embracing the notion that a penal
sentence should "encompass the community's condemnation of the defendant's misconduct." People v. Silver, 10 A.D.2d 274, 276, 199 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (1st Dep't
1960). See People v. Golden, 41 A.D.2d 242, 342 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1st Dep't 1973);
People v. Hardy, 34 A.D.2d 843, 310 N.Y.S.2d 357 (3d Dep't 1970); People v.
Cotter, 25 A.D.2d 609, 267 N.Y.S.2d 679 (4th Dep't 1966); People v. Burghardt, 17
A.D.2d 912, 233 N.Y.S.2d 60 (4th Dep't 1962).
130. Public sentiment may take the form of "community denunciation," a chief
aim of sentencing. Frankel, supra note 24, at 10; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-05, 436-37 (1958). While "community
condemnation" is expressed in "the legislature's prior grading and characterization,
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device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation,
and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of
the punishing authority himself or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted." 1 31 Expressions of denunciation or condemnation
by the community are generally reflective of the community's attitude
concerning the gravity of the offense.1 32 Although legislatures make
the initial "judgments of seriousness" in setting the maximum penalties and in scaling minimum penalties according to their sense of the
gravity of the offenses involved, "these statutory limits are . . . seldom
decisions" because of judicial discretion
decisive in actual sentencing 133
in indeterminate sentencing.
Judge Learned Hand has noted the difficulty in determining the
types of conduct which "outrage" the moral feelings of most people,
without some sort of "national inquisition, like a Gallup Poll.' 1 34 A
recent study, however, has shown that this difficulty can be overcome, and has found a substantial degree of consensus as to the degree
of seriousness of various crimes "among blacks and whites, males and
females, high and low socioeconomic levels, and among [differing]
in general terms," it is also expressed in the particular sentence imposed pursuant to
judicial discretion. Id. at 437-38.
Many commentators today favor a theory of commensurate or just deserts: that the
severity of the punishment ought to comport with the gravity of the offense. See
generally R. SINGER, supra note 34, at 28; Gross, ProportionalPunishment and
Justifiable Sentences, in SENTENCING 272-83 (H. Gross & A. Von Hirsch eds. 1981);
Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 243-55; Feinberg, supra note 129, at 24.
131. Feinberg, supra note 129, at 24. In essence, the judge is "commissioned to
speak" for the community in ultimately determining the sentence. United States v.
Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 647 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd mem., 498 F.2d 1396 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975).
132. One of the subjective factors to which a sentencing court must pay heed is
"[it's] perception of the community's condemnation of the misconduct." Hopkins,
supra note 38, at 492-93.
133. Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 248. Therefore, the question of whether a
judge should rely strictly on his or her own judgment regarding the seriousness of the
offense or include in the consideration the additional factor of actual community
sentiment regarding seriousness, becomes pertinent. Most judges are white males
from middle and upper-class economic strata. See J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES &
S. SHANE-DUBOw, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES 128-30, 141 (1980) (women and ethnic
minorities are underrepresented in the judiciary). Therefore, any educative process
that would aid in dispelling unexplored and unadmitted personal biases would also
increase public trust in the judiciary, in which so much discretion is currently
invested. M. FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 17-24; W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A
STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING 28-43 (1974); see also L. ForER, supra note 20, at 202
("Middle-aged and middle-class judges . . . are understandably reluctant to send
people like themselves to prisons where they know what is likely to happen to
them.").
134. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947) (naturalization
proceeding in which determination of "good moral character" necessary).
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levels of educational attainment." 135 This study suggests that "[w]hatever the complexities in the concept of seriousness [are] . . . people
from widely different walks of life can make common-sense judgments
on the comparative gravity of offenses and come to fairly similar

conclusions."

36

1

It has been shown statistically that the elderly are the most fearful
of inherent dangers in their everyday environments. The groups most
affected by fear of specific violent crimes are blacks, women, the
young, and people living in cities. 1 37 The poor may be particularly
concerned with "lack of lawfulness and objectivity in the administration of criminal justice."'' 3 Thus, community condemnation arises

from many different quarters of the community, all of which should
be considered in any attempt to gauge the pulse of the community as
to the seriousness of an offense.
B. Examples of Public/Community Pressure
A district court judge once stated that in determining a just sentence, "[w]e are not permitted . . . to overlook that the community
for which the judge is commissioned to speak ultimately decides and
demands and is owed justice too." 13 When faced with concrete com135. Rossi, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224 (1974), quoted in Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 248.
InI the 1960's, prior to the Rossi study, a pioneering study was performed by sociologists Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang at the University of Pennsylvania. They
asked a group of judges, college students and policemen to rate the "seriousness" of
various offenses on an eleven-point scale. Considerable agreement was indicated by
the data. Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 248. Subsequent criticism of these findings on
the ground that the sample group was unrepresentative prompted the Rossi study.
Rossi's sample included individuals from different racial, occupational and educational subgroups. They were asked to rate 140 different offenses as to "seriousness,"
on a scale of one to nine. Rossi, supra, at 248.
136. Von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 248.
137. See FIGGIE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20. Poor people and old people, among
others, are particularly affected by fear of inherent dangers. Id. at 20, 51-52. Fear of
specific crimes is partly due to the high rate of victimization experienced by a group,
such as high murder rates among blacks and high rape rates among women. Id. at
36-37.
138. Nagel, The Poor, Too, Want Law and Order, in GOVERNMENT LAWLESSNESS
IN AMERICA 240 (1971). "It is particularly unfortunate to imply that law and order is
a goal of the middle class and an anti-goal of the poor. The truth of the matter seems
to be that the poor, too, want law and order.
... Id. at 238. As one trial judge
observed, "[t]here is no question that street criminals are more likely to be sentenced
to prison than white-collar criminals and that they will serve longer sentences." L.
FoRE, supra note 20, at 200. The fact that "[t]he media, the American Bar Association, and many concerned citizens are demanding that white-collar criminals be
'punished' " is a form of community condemnation. Id. at 197-98.
139. United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 647 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 498
F.2d 1396 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975). The defendants were found
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munity pressure, however, a court may deem it to be an inappropriate
factor for consideration. Nevertheless, the holding of the case often
speaks to the contrary. In a Wisconsin case 140 involving prison escapees, one of the chief issues was whether a notation by the court
clerk containing a reference to "local pressure to impose a lengthy
sentence" indicated that the sentences were "tainted." 14' The Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin stated that while "a judge must not be influenced by public or community pressure" in reaching an appropriate
sentencing decision, the notation did not indicate that the sentencing
was improperly enhanced. 42 Although the court maintained that it
was inappropriate for the public to put "heat on the judiciary,"
deterrence was recognized as an appropriate factor to be considered in
sentencing in order to protect citizens from potential prison escapees. 143 Thus, while both trial and appellate courts denied that
community sentiment was influential, the additional prison terms
ultimately imposed and upheld had been urged by the public.144
In a New York case, non-party community leaders who merely
expressed an interest in the trial were permitted to testify in the
prosecution of New York City landlords who had violated city housing

guilty of tax fraud and were sentenced to nine months in prison, and fined $20,000
and $10,000, respectively. A defendant corporation was also fined $25,000. Id. at
649-50. One of the factors the court considered, though purely in a theoretical
manner, was: "[h]ow frightening to the community is the particular crime?" Id. at
649. Just because fear is not inspired does not mean that white-collar defendants
should not be punished; "[e]ven though white-collar crime is nonviolent, surely the
taking by deceit of a million dollars deserves as much, if not more of a penalty than a
burglary or robbery of eleven dollars." L. FoRER, supra note 20, at 202. For a
discussion of the debate concerning whether white-collar criminals should be imprisoned or fined, see id. at 200-08.
140. Weinfurter v. State, No. 79-314-CR (Wis. 1979) (unpublished limited precedent opinion available on LEXIS, States library, WI file) (defendants, prison escapees, were sentenced to four-year terms to run consecutively to the sentences they
were serving).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. In a West Virginia case, State v. Wotring, 279 S.E.2d 182 (W. Va. 1981),
a defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, sentenced to one-to-five years in the West Virginia State Prison for Women and fined
$15,000. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia briefly noted that "we are troubled by the severity of the sentence" in
that defendant was a widow supporting three children, had no prior criminal history
and her crime was non-violent. Moreover, the court held that "[t]he record reflects
that the trial court was aware of, and may have acceded to, intense community
pressure surrounding this case. Be that as it may, we are unwilling to find error in the
appellant's sentencing." Id. at 192.
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and sanitary laws. 145 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
noted that this was a "distressing circumstance" but affirmed the
6
sentences because they were "well merited." 14
Community pressure does not always take the form of condemnation. In United States v. Bergman, 147 United States District Court
Judge Marvin Frankel received "scores of letters" praising the defendant. 148 The court also received a petition in which the signers denounced the defendant and urged a stiff sentence. The court summarily disregarded the petition because the opinions of the signers were
based on reading the newspaper; they had no real connection with the
defendant or the case. 149 In a New York case, a trial court followed the
recommendations of approximately 100 persons in the community,
including psychiatrists, educators and community leaders, in placing
a defendant convicted of sodomy on probation. 150 The appellate court
upheld the trial court's determination, attaching great significance to
the fact that the group included the parents of the victim. 151 Thus,
rather than condemning the defendant's misconduct, the community
145. People v. Zelkowitz, 8 A.D.2d 161, 162, 186 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (1st Dep't
1959), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 754 (1960).
146. Id. at 163, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 851. One defendant was sentenced to 30 days
imprisonment and fined $1,050. The other was fined $500. Id. at 162-63, 186
N.Y.S.2d at 850. While stating that every defendant and the public at large "is
entitled . . . to have the appearance of judicial impartiality, untrammeled by passion, pressure and prejudice," the court recognized that the unscrupulousness of some
landlords and the poor housing conditions which resulted required stringent administrative measures and judicial support for those measures. Id. at 162, 186 N.Y.S.2d at
850-51. Thus, the urging by the community leaders that it was necessary to make an
example of these defendants, though disapproved of by the court, id., 186 N.Y.S.2d
at 850, may actually have reinforced its recognition of the impact on the public of
defendants' misconduct. Such a "reminder" may have aided the court in arriving at a
just sentence. ContraPeople v. Rednour, 24 111. App. 3d 1072, 1076, 322 N.E.2d 492,
496 (App. Ct. 1975). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed defendant's conviction
but remanded for resentencing because of trial court's failure to notify defendant of
his right to counsel at sentencing. The court also noted that "the trial court improperly considered the public's displeasure with the number of recent burglaries, none of
which were connected to the defendant and the public clamor for stricter sentences."
Id. at 1077, 322 N.E.2d at 496.
147. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendant
guilty of participation in a scheme to defraud the United States by making fraudulent
claims for Medicaid funds and sentenced to four months imprisonment).
148. Id. at 498.
149. Id.
150. People v. Mosher, 24 A.D.2d 47, 49, 263 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (4th Dep't 1965)
(sentence of defendant convicted of sodomy suspended and defendant placed on
probation on condition of his attendance in therapy and employment in a field
removed from young people).
151. Id. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) now provides for "consideration of the consequences of the offense for the victim, including the victim's family and the community." Id. (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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be given a chance for treatspecifically requested that the defendant
15 2
ment and not be incarcerated.
The danger of judicial rejection of community sentiment is illustrated in a 1982 New York case, People v. Jagnjic.153 The defendant, a
forty-three year old man, was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse,
assault in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child, his
ten-year-old niece.154 Despite the fact that the crime was "deliberate
and premeditated," 1 55 the appellate court vacated the sentence and
remanded for resentencing pending a psychiatric evaluation. 56 The
57
majority gave little weight to the "undoubted" traumatic effect
upon the victim and no consideration was given to the deterrence of
such crimes. A concurring judge stated that if the purpose of the
"extremely harsh sentence" was "to manifest society's horror at what
occurred, it is a sufficient answer that defendant was no less horrified
by what he had done."15 The dissent appropriately pointed out that
"[w]e do not know that this horrible act was 'as offensive to [defendant's] moral principles as to those of society as a whole.' Expressions of
remorse or horror . . . may be sincere or insincere . . . . " 59 What is
clear is that "[t]he condemnation of crimes against the young is deeply
152. Mosher, 24 A.D.2d at 49, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
153. 85 A.D.2d 135, 447 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dep't 1982).
154. "[T]he victim's condition required an operation and a hospital stay of five to
[Defendant] inserted the rubber penis strapped to his body into his 10six days ....
"
year-old niece's vagina for several minutes which act resulted in hemorrhaging ...
Id. at 140, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 442. (Lupiano, J., dissenting). The defendant was
sentenced to concurrent 5-to-15 and 2-to-6 year terms of imprisonment. Id. at 136,
447 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
155. Id. at 141, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (Lupiano, J., dissenting); see id. at 136, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 440 (Sandier, J., concurring) (defendant picked up niece from school,
drove to beach, abused and assaulted her then tried to stem bleeding with pads
previously purchased).
156. Id. at 136, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40. This decision was reached despite the fact
that "the defendant [did] not contend that he was ever insane or incompetent. ...
The defendant ... had the opportunity to raise these matters at plea and sentence.
He did not do so, and thus this Court should not consider those matters upon this
appeal." Id. at 138-39, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting). The majority
stated that "[i]f the approach is simply punishment or deterrence then the sentence
... should not be disturbed." Id. at 135, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 439. The majority
concluded, however, that "prison will obviously not have any effect with respect to
rehabilitation nor does it help his family nor the victim." Id. at 136, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
439.
157. Id. at 135, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
158. Id. at 137, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 440. (Sandler, J., concurring). The concurring
opinion emphasized that "[e]xcept for this single event," id., which was described by
the majority as "aberrational," id. at 135, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 439, "the defendant
would appear to be a worthwhile, honest, industrious human being." Id. at 137, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 440.
159. Id. at 142, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 443.

292

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

ingrained in the ethical and moral history of western civilization." 160
Had the court considered carefully the societal condemnation, doubt
might have been raised as to the "sufficiency" of defendant's "answer." 161
C. Organized Public Pressure-Court Observer Groups
The court observer movement is burgeoning in the United States. 162
Besides ordinary monitoring and data-taking functions, 163 some court

observer groups have specifically set themselves the task of flooding
the courts during particular proceedings to remind judges that they
represent the past and potential victims of the specific type of crime
involved.
One court observer group, "Attack on Crime Against the Elderly"
(ACAE), was formed after the arrest of a suspect for the "push-in
robbery"1 64 of an eighty-two-year old woman.1 65 A lawyer and a
social worker employed at neighboring senior citizen centers used the
energy generated by the outrage of the local senior citizenry to launch
ACAE.I 66 They organized senior volunteers to monitor the courts,
assist victims of crime and speak out in lectures and interviews with
1 67
the media on the subject of crime directed against the elderly.
Approximately fifty people were trained as court monitors to attend
all phases of the criminal proceedings. The monitors were taught that
right to a fair
their function was not to interfere with the defendant's
168
trial, but only to be "visible" in the courtroom.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 137, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 440 (Sandier, J.,concurring).

162

See P.

NEJELSKI, THE TENSION OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION 6-7

(Nat'l Center

for State Courts, Research Essay Series No. E004, 1977); Stecich, A Survey of Court
Observer Programs, 58 JUDICATURE 470 (1975).
163. Stecich, supra note 162, at 471, 473.
164. A "push-in robbery" describes the situation where the assailants push the
victim into his or her apartment while the victim is unlocking the door before
proceeding with the robbery. Interview with directors of project "Attack on Crime
Against the Elderly," under auspices of East Bronx Council on Aging, Parkchester,
Bronx, New York in New York City (July 20, 1982) (directors are an attorney and a
social worker) [hereinafter cited as Interview]. The description of the accused as the
"godfather of crime against the elderly" was coined by Bronx police officers who said
that he was the leader of a ring of muggers who "specialized" in robbing old people.
Id.
165. Interview, supra note 164.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The sixth amendment provides that: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury ...."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is no question that
the Sixth Amendment permits and even presumes open trials as a norm." Gannett
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Monitors were present at the trial and sentencing of the robbery
suspect who received the maximum possible term of imprisonment. 9
The directors of the project expressed the view that the sentence was
rare in its severity and was a direct outcome of the presence of the
court monitors and the intensity of organized citizen outrage concerning routine victimization of the elderly. 170
Aside from court observer groups with specifically defined purposes, there are many "concerned citizens projects" with more loosely
defined goals, such as proposing and pressing for judicial reform
legislation, educating citizens regarding the court system and perhaps

Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385 (1979). Members of the public have no
constitutional right to attend criminal trials, however; the right to a public trial is
conferred upon the accused. Id. at 379-80. The public's "right of access" is limited, in
part, by the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. at 398 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
In New York, "[t]he sittings of every court within [the] state shall be public .
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968). The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York held, however, that "[g]iven the display of public curiosity in this
sensational murder case and the extensive media coverage it had generated in the
county of venue, which necessarily 'would threaten the impaneling of a constitutionally impartial jury,' " closing the pretrial hearing to the public was a proper exercise
of discretion and accorded with procedural due process. Reilly v. McKnight, 80
A.D.2d 333, 335, 439 N.Y.S.2d 727, 729 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 1002, 430
N.E.2d 922, 446 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1981).
169. Interview, supra note 164. The conviction was affirmed. People v. Timmons,
65 A.D.2d 680 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 45 N.Y.2d 972 (1978).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held that the presence of a court observer
group called "Concerned Citizens Against Crime," during a defendant's preliminary
hearing did not constitute prejudicial community pressure. State v. Cooper, No. 77819-CR (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (unpublished limited precedent opinion available on
LEXIS, States library, WI file) (conviction of defendant for attempted murder and
armed robbery and consecutive sentences of 30 years and 10 years for each count,
respectively, affirmed).
170. The goal of ACAE was the elimination of lenient sentences for defendants
convicted of crimes against the elderly. The goal of the "Law and Order Campaign
Committee" (LOCC) of California was described as the weeding out of "softheaded" judges up for re-election. See P. NEJELSKI, supra note 162, at 7; Tell and
Winer, Soft Justice: The Hard Facts, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Work,
Rightists Target Calif. Judges, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1. In California,
trial judges are initially appointed by the governor but must be reelected. "[L]iberals
on the California bench see LOCC and its campaign funds as a serious threat." Id.,
at 8, col. 2. As shown by a 1978 study, there is a direct correlation between campaign
spending and receiving the most votes. Id., at 8, col. 2. Another California group,
"Citizens for Law and Order" (CLO) of Alameda County, shares the same goal. See
Stecich, supra note 162, at 472; Tell and Winer, supra, at 1, col. 1. This latter group
also initiates recall of judges who are unduly lenient and pressures for stricter
sentencing practices. Stecich, supra note 162, at 472. Many have conceded that the
CLO's court watching has had an impact on the disposition of criminal cases in
Alameda County. The director of the Alameda County Bar Association has maintained, however, that CLO has had no impact on judges with integrity. Id. at 473.
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most importantly, demonstrating to the legal community that local
171
citizens are concerned about the courts and the judicial process.
One trial judge believes that deterrence is a "myth" because in most
cases "no one knows or cares what happens to the run-of-the-mill
criminals who are tried in state courts." 17 2 The increased visibility of
court-watching groups at trials and sentencing proceedings, however,
may help to make the "myth" more of a reality.
D. Pressure From the Press
In this age of mass communication, expression of public sentiment
and press coverage are closely interwoven. 173 The press not only reports, but also "reflects and shapes the community's pattern of
thought.'1 74 Recognizing this, courts may look to the media to ascer-

171. Stecich, supra note 162, at 474-77. The head of the Westchester County
branch of the Gray Panthers, for example, organized a group to watch a local court
for one year. One of the purposes of the group was education of its members through
observation. The group noticed that judges treated the defendants "too casually."
One of the defendants, for example, had harassed a witness with a threatening
gesture-drawing his hand across his throat-and the judge seemed to ignore it. One
member of the group had the opportunity to express her views to the judge regarding
her distress over such a "lack of decorum" and the leniency of sentences. Telephone
interview with Meredith Colton, convener of Gray Panthers of Westchester County
(July 9, 1982).
172. L. FoaRa, supra note 20, at 49.
173. People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 949-50, 623 P.2d 240, 247, 171 Cal. Rptr.
679, 686, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981) (conviction for murder, kidnapping,
robbery, receiving stolen property, and possession of arms and death penalty affirmed; pretrial publicity did not affect fairness of trial).
174. Id. at 974, 623 P.2d at 262, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
There is the danger that exposure of an issue by the news media may be sensationalistic and the news item may mislead the reader into thinking that the view expressed
by the particular news item represents the voice of public opinion in general.
Newspapers that have large circulations have great potential to shape a community's pattern of thought. The New York Post, for example, had a readership of
960,000 as of Jan. 20, 1983 in the New York metropolitan area. News items published
in the New York Post, therefore, potentially have the power to inflame the community or create local issues. For example, the following articles appeared on the same
page on the same day: DA: Freeing Potential Killer is Nuts, Is This Justice?, N.Y.
Post, July 13, 1982, at 3, col. 6; Killer Gets 'Life Without Hope', This is Justice, id.
In a recent article in the New York Daily News, Soft judges, Hard-core crooks,
Junk Justice, criminal court judges were attacked for their leniency:
Gerald Fudge doesn't understand why the city's Criminal Court kept
letting him go . . .[o]ver the past five years, he's run up 39 arrests and 29
convictions. . . . The answers are very simple-appallingly simple. In
New York City, there's no such thing as a tough Criminal Court Judge.
There are only degrees of soft. And there are far too many judges who are
afraid to start handing out stiff sentences.
Daily News, July 20, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
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tain societal bias or hostility toward an accused 175 and criticism of the
judiciary.
Several landmark Supreme Court cases have involved criminal contempt convictions of defendants who published articles or editorials
which allegedly caused disrespect for a court or prejudiced its decision. 7 6 The Supreme Court has recognized that the judiciary may be
"sensitive to the winds of public opinion." 177 The power of contempt,
however, is not to be used by the courts to stifle public opinion
because "[jiudges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in
a hardy climate." 78 Only where there is a "clear and present danger"
of a "substantive evil" may the first amendment freedoms of speech
and press be abridged. 17
80
the Supreme Court reversed a conIn Pennekamp v. Florida,1
tempt citation entered against a newspaper publisher and an editor
for inaccurately reporting court proceedings and suggesting that the
judges were biased in favor of defendants.18 ' The Court held that the

175. Harris,28 Cal. 3d at 975, 623 P.2d at 262, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
176. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), a union officer sent a telegram
to the Secretary of Labor, which was published in the newspaper, calling the judge's
decision in the case outrageous and threatening a strike if it were enforced. Id. at
275-76. The telegram was published while a motion for a new trial was pending in a
case involving a dispute between two unions. Id. In Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior
Court, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), considered jointly with Bridges, a newspaper publisher
and its managing editor were cited for contempt for publishing three editorials. One
of the editorials stated that the judge would make a "serious mistake" if he granted
probation to two members of a labor union who were convicted of assault of nonunion truck drivers. Id. at 271-72. In both cases, the Court reversed the contempt
convictions, id. at 278, holding that there must be a "clear and present danger" of a
"substantive evil" before first amendment freedoms of speech or press would be
abridged. Id. at 262-63. The "degree of imminence" of the "substantive evil,"
namely, disrespect for the judiciary and interference with the fair and orderly
administration of justice in a pending case, must be extremely high. Id. at 263, 270.
The Court stated that "[t]he assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion," which prizes the "privilege [of] speak[ing] one's mind .... " Id.
at 270. The editorial in question "did no more than threaten future adverse criticism
which was reasonably to be expected anyway in the event of a lenient disposition.
Id. at 273. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter made the distinction
between press "comment" and "intimidation." Id. at 291 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He maintained that the state's action was justified because a powerful newspaper was attempting to intimidate a judge "who within a year would have to secure
popular approval if he desired continuance in office." Id. at 299.
177. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
178. Id.
179. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 262-63.
180. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
181. Id. at 337-39.
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threat to fair judicial administration did not pose a "clear and present
danger" as the criticism was of judicial action already taken in nonjury proceedings. 18 2 In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter
stressed the obligation of the press to "criticize and to advocate .. .
with the fullest sense of responsibility. . . .It should not and may not
attempt to influence judges or juries before they have made up their
83
minds on pending controversies." 1
One year later, in Craig v. Harney,184 the Court reversed a contempt conviction of a publisher and newspaperman who had unfairly
reported a case in which a new trial motion was pending. 8 5 The
Court held that to punish for contempt, the danger must not merely
be a likely or probable threat to the administration of justice, rather,
186
"it must immediately imperil."'
The case of Bernard Bergman 87 illustrates the intensity with which
today's press may pressure a judge to impose a severe sentence. As a
result of New York investigations of nursing homes, Bernard
Bergman, a prominent figure in the nursing home business, was indicted by both federal and New York State grand juries. 188 The press
had been actively covering the investigations prior to Bergman's indictments and, according to one commentator, "tr[ying] and convict[ing] him of almost every crime. . . imaginable" related to his control
of dozens of substandard nursing homes in New York State.18 9 Pursuant to a plea agreement reached between the federal and state prosecutors, Bergman pleaded guilty in the New York State Supreme Court

182. Id. at 348-50. The editorials and cartoon complained of technicalities and
delays which seemed to give excessive protection to defendants. Id. at 367-68.
(Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
183. Id. at 365. "To deny that bludgeoning or poisonous comment has power to
influence, or at least to disturb, the task of judging is to play make-believe and to
assume that men in gowns are angels. The psychological aspects of this problem
become particularly pertinent in the case of elected judges with short tenure." Id. at

359.
184. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
185. Id. at 376-78.
186. Id. at 376.

187. 57 A.D.2d 749, 395 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 890,
366 N.E.2d 885, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1977).
188. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1977) (denial of writ of
habeas corpus based on defendant's claim that state prosecutor breached plea bargain agreement affirmed). The federal grand jury indicted Bergman for filing false
tax returns, submitting false Medicaid claims, making fraudulent statements to the
government, and conspiring to defraud the government and commit the above
offenses. The state grand jury indicted him for conspiracy, filing fraudulent reimbursement claims, larceny, and obstruction of governmental administration. Id.
189. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 118 (1982).
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to making unlawful payments to a state legislator, and in the United
States district court' 90 to filing false tax returns and defrauding the
federal government. The plea agreement also specified that the special
state prosecutor was to recommend to the state court that no sentence
additional to that imposed by the federal court be imposed.' 9 '
United States District Court Judge Marvin Frankel sentenced
Bergman to four months' imprisonment. 192 The public response to the
sentence was "immediate, substantial and generally adverse." 91 3 The
media outcry was "deafening: the newspapers, radio and television
stations condemned the sentence." 19 4 The New York Times, for example, printed excerpts fromJudge Frankel's sentencing memorandum,
the full text of the special state prosecutor's press statement 9 5 and an
editorial which expressed the opinion "that the sentence made 'the
odds on white-collar crime look rather good' and could 'only reinforce
cynicism about the realities of equal justice under law.' "16 New York
Supreme Court Justice Melia subsequently sentenced Bergman to a

190. According to the plea bargaining agreement, Bergman was to plead guilty in
federal court to filing false tax returns and knowing and willful participation in a
scheme to defraud the federal government, including submission of false Medicaid
claims, Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d at 707 n.3; United States v. Bergman, 416
F. Supp. 496, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and in state court to making unlawful payments
to Albert Blumenthal of the New York State Legislature. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569
F.2d at 707 n.3.
191. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d at 707 n.3.
192. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 497.
193. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d at 711 (quoting the district judge).
194. A. DERSHOwITZ, supra note 189, at 135.
195. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d at 711. In his press statement, the Special
State Prosecutor expressed extreme disappointment with the federal sentence and
questioned whether justice had been accomplished. He stated that the sentence,
which he termed "special justice for the privileged," generated extreme cynicism
among the people. He claimed that those who have "abused the elderly" and "fashioned for themselves a life of luxury, must learn that they will go to jail for their
crimes." Id. at 710 n.9.
A recent example of a prosecutor releasing a statement to the press concerning
sentencing occurred when District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman released a letter she
had written to Justice Lombardo of the New York State Supreme Court. In the letter
she urged a 4-to-12 year sentence for the defendant who had pleaded guilty to
manslaughter for intentionally starving her baby to death. Justice Lombardo said he
intended to give her five years probation and require her to undergo psychiatric
treatment. The defendant had faced a maximum prison term of 15 years for second
degree manslaughter. The justice charged that the District Attorney told reporters
that "probation 'would be a total travesty of justice' and expressed hope that the
judge would 'reflect' on the 'public outcry.' " Holtzman Stand Upsets Judge, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1982, at B3, col. 5-6.
196. Bergman, 569 F.2d at 711. The New York Post was concerned about whether
the sentence established " 'any serious deterrent to new nursing home fraud.' " Id.
The Daily News spoke of " 'powder-puff treatment.' " Id.
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one-year term of imprisonment, consecutive to the federal sentence,197
thereby departing from the plea agreement." 8 One commentator has
indicated that the state sentence may have resulted, in part, from the
intense pressure on the judge to impose a stiffer sentence than that
imposed in federal court.9 9 Although the press criticism was of judicial action already taken, as in Pennekamp, the criticism may have
influenced pending proceedings, as in Craig. Given the Court's holdings in these cases, however, it would be difficult even under the
circumstances presented in the Bergman cases, for any court to thwart
20 0
the press' first amendment freedoms.
E. Political Pressure
In People v. Bergman, 20 ' there was also considerable political pressure on the state judge to impose a harsh sentence. New York State
Assemblyman Andrew Stein, chairman of a state investigation of
nursing homes, voiced his indignation to the press and later wrote and
called upon Justice Melia to urge a stricter sentence. 20 2 He also urged
New Yorkers to write letters to the judge asking for " 'the harshest
sentence legally permissible' ",203 and organized a march outside the
judge's chambers on the day of sentencing.0 4

197. Id. at 713.
198. See note 190 supra. The state judge had asserted repeatedly that he was not
bound by the special prosecutor's recommendations, Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569
F.2d at 708, 710, though he would give them substantial weight. Id. at 714. His
stated reasons for imposing a sentence in addition to the federal sentence were the
seriousness of the state crime to which the federal judge had given little consideration
and the defendant's efforts to avoid restitution. Id. at 714-15.
199. A. DMSHOWITZ, supra note 189, at 121, 125. The commentator, A. Dershowitz, was counsel for defendant Bergman.
200. A different problem was presented in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966), in which "freedom of press" did not extend to endangerment of defendant's
right to a fair trial. Sheppard was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the defendant, a doctor, was convicted of murdering his wife. Id. at 335. The Court held that
the defendant was deprived of a fair trial consistent with due process because of
prejudicial news publicity. "[B]edlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and
newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom ..
." Id. at 355. The Court also
noted that the case came on for trial two weeks before the general election in which
both the chief prosecutor and the judge were running. Id. at 342. For another case
involving jury prejudice due to massive pretrial publicity, see People v. Manson, 61
Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
201. 57 A.D.2d 749, 395 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 890,
366 N.E.2d 885, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1977).
202. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d at 711.
203. A. DmsHowiTz, supra note 189, at 120.
204. Id. at 136.
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The defendant Bergman had argued that because the state judge
20 5
was an elected official, the potential for prejudice was heightened.
Although the court admitted that "elected judges are more subject to
' 20
the passions of the times [than are federal judges with life tenure],
the court pointed out that nowhere is there "authority for the proposition that a defendant has a constitutional right to a state judiciary
independent from all political pressures. It is assumed, rather, that the
justice regardless of the
judiciary is capable of dispensing dispassionate
20 7
type or amounts of pressure put on it."

205. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, No. 77 Civ. 3344 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1977) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file), aff'd, 569 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1977).
206. Id. Many states authorize selection of trial judges by the election process. See
J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES & S. SHANE-DUBOW, supra note 133, at 122.
207. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, No. 77 Civ. 3344 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1977) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file), aff'd, 569 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, a New York Supreme Court justice recently expressed the fear that should he run
for reelection, he would lose because of a particularly unpopular lenient sentencing
decision to which the press and New York City Mayor Edward Koch had devoted
much attention. Interview with Justice of New York Supreme Court, New York
County, in New York City (to remain anonymous by request) (July 15, 1982). The
justice further stated that the combination of pressure from the press, the public and
the mayor would undoubtedly result in his defeat. He noted that many of his judicial
colleagues shared similar worries, in that they feared that if they did not mete out
harsh sentences, they would not be reelected or reappointed. Id. Along similar lines,
when Judge Stone was asked whether "being strong is a deterrent to reappointment
[or] reelection," he replied, "Yes, definitely." W. GAYLIN, supra note 133, at 111.
The Trowbridge case, 95 Idaho 640,. 516 P.2d 362 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 117-24 supra, illustrates the potential for a trial judge to be influenced
by the sentiments of voters, who represent an economically or politically powerful
group in a given community. In that case, a range rider was given a five year prison
term for stealing calves. The desire of the ranching community to make an example
of this defendant, a first felony offender, was noted in the presentence report. Id.
The Aldoupolis case, discussed at notes 1-14 supra and accompanying text, illustrates
the potential for a trial judge to be influenced by the sentiments of voters and the
governor, see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text, in that the trial judge revoked
suspended sentences of convicted rapists after public outcry.
While the subject of parole is beyond the scope of this Comment, political pressure, instigated by public opinion, can have an effect on parole decisions. William
Fain was serving a life sentence for murdering a 17-year old boy and raping two
young women. He was held past his scheduled parole date on two occasions, because
of public and political pressure. Bishop, For Your Information, 9 CrUM. DEF. 4
(1982). When his parole date became imminent the first time, the parole board
"bec[a]me aware of public outrage, impressive in its vehemence and the number of
people expressing it .... "In re Fain, 65 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 135 Cal. Rptr. 543,
553 (Ct. App. 1976). The court found that the public's outcry was "new information"
which the parole board was required to consider, id., and that rescission of parole
was proper. Id. at 382, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 545. One legislator also protested Fain's
release. Id. at 385, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 547. When Fain came up for parole again, the
murder victim's family and friends organized a " 'Keep Fain In Committee' " and
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There has been extensive debate concerning whether judges, like
legislators, should be responsible to the electorate. 20

On one side of

the issue is the professional concern for judicial independence, and on
the other, the public concern for judicial accountability. 20° Some
commentators believe that specific judicial decisions ought not to be
the subject of public review. 210 According to this view, the reflection
of the unpopularity of a decision in election results is an "improper
and unfortunate restraint on judicial integrity and independence and
frequently causes the political defeat of a good judge.

'

21 1

Direct elec-

tions, therefore, are thought to be harmful to the judicial system
"because of the public's ignorance of the standards and rules by which
judges are governed. ' 212 Conversely, it has been argued that it is
inconsistent with the concept of democratic government to isolate the
213
judiciary entirely from some kind of accountability.
The necessity for accountability is exemplified in a recent Wisconsin
case in which a state judge called a five-year old victim of a sexual

obtained 62,500 signatures on a petition which stated that he was too dangerous for
release. Bishop, supra. The state legislature urged the parole board to reconsider and
the board subsequently denied Fain's release. Id.
208. Mendelson, Problems of Judicial Independence and Accountability, 53 FLA.
B.J. 138, 140 (1979). See P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

20-28 (1980).

209. Mendleson, supra note 208, at 138.
210. A recent New Jersey case illustrates the potent effect public and political
pressure may have on a judicial proceeding. The defendant was convicted of "carnal
abuse" and "debauching the morals of a minor" and was initially sentenced to a
custodial term of fifteen years. The defendant claimed that any sentence of incarceration was cruel and unusual punishment as being life threatening because of his
obesity. Physical examination of defendant confirmed that incarceration would be
life threatening. At the reconsideration-of-sentence hearing, the trial court vacated
the prison sentence and sentenced defendant to three years probation and a $2,000.00
fine. Telephone interview with counsel for defendant [hereinafter cited as Defense
Interview], in State v. Giorgianni, 91 N.J. 255 (1982) (mem.). The Attorney General
of the State of New Jersey and a member of the General Assembly advocated
reincarceration of the defendant and removal or impeachment of the sentencing
judge. Defense Interview, supra. The prison sentence was ultimately reimposed, id.,
and one may speculate whether political pressure and/or public opinion influenced
the reimposition of sentence, and if so, whether it was proper for the judge to "reflect
on the public outcry." See note 195 supra.
211. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 138. Sentencing decisions of judges,
however, are not often exposed to public scrutiny and most sitting judges are usually
reelected. P. DUBOIS, supra note 208, at 32-33. An individual judge may be defeated
when the press stirs the public to anger by means of sensationalistic reporting or
when there is organized opposition in a competitive election. See notes 170 & 174

supra and accompanying text.
212. Mendelson, supra note 208, at 138.
213. Id. at 140.
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assault "an unusual, sexually promiscuous young lady" and placed her
of the town began a campaign
attacker on probation. 2 4 The residents
15
2
to recall the state judge from office.

In theory, the electorate may hold a judge accountable for specific
sentencing decisions through election and recall. As a practical matter, however, these means of accountability are not often employed. 216
The methods by which the appointing power holds the judiciary
accountable are perhaps more potent in those jurisdictions which
provide for appointment rather than election to the bench, since the
appointing process itself can be a tool for ensuring that particular
types of persons fill judicial positions.21 7 Although presidents, governors or mayors, who may expect appointees to "hew to the party line"
have often been surprised to learn that judges are independent, 21 8
judicial independence2 19 may be curtailed when the appointing power
voices an opinion on sentencing, as in Aldoupolis.2 20 It is difficult to
determine whether the statements of a governor, for example, will
cause a judge to deliberate more thoughtfully in future sentencing or
whether these statements merely institute fear in relation to future
career prospects.

214. Victim, 5, 'Promiscuous,' Her Attacker Gets Probation, Nat'l L.J., January
25, 1982, at 3, col. 3. The judge's reasons for the lenient sentence was that the child
"initiated" the sexual contact with the defendant, a 21-year old man, who "did not
Id., at 37.
know enough to knock off her advances .
215. Id., at 3, col. 3.
216. See P. NEJELSKI, supra note 162, at 4.
217. The bench is relatively homogeneous. See note 133 supra. Until significant
diversification occurs, "courts struggle to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry." J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES & S. SHANE-DUBOW, supra note 133, at
141.
218. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979).
219.
"Judicial Independence" has several definitions: By one definition, independence refers to the freedom of the judge, from any external influences
which might impair his or her impartiality . . . and his or her ability to
decide each case "on its own merits." In a much broader view of the
concept, judicial independence refers to the ability of the judiciary to
perform its functions of judicial review . . . without fear of retribution by
the elected branches or the population at large.
P. DUBOIS, supra note 208, at 20-21. Historically, the term "judicial independence"
referred to "the independence of the judiciary . . . from other branches of government," i.e., the separation of powers. Kaufman, supra note 218, at 713. According to
Judge Marvin Frankel, " 'judicial independence' " means that "judges are to be
sheltered from the clamor of the mob and from immediate punishment or reward for
their decisions." M. FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 67.
220. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. Victims
Victims have been the "forgotten people in the system"' 22 1 because
the only parties in a criminal proceeding are the state and the defendant.22 2 Generally, they have had no official role except to provide
2
evidence . 23
An example of abusive judicial treatment of a victim is set forth in
People v. Beasley. 224 The victim, a twenty-two year old woman, was
abducted, robbed, raped, and terrorized with threats of mutilation
and death by three men.2 25 She was subsequently directed to be
present at the probation hearings and was accompanied by a police
officer. The trial judge castigated the officer and his superior for their
solicitude toward the victim. 226 The California Court of Appeal noted
221. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 17 (W. McDonald ed. 1976) (quoting
Judge Murphy of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 1971).
There is an enormous amount of literature on the offender: his rights; the
role he plays in criminal process; his perceptions of that process; the
influence which that process has and the damage that it can do to his life's
prospects by labeling him a criminal; his racial, social, economic, marital,
psychological, physical, and behavioral characteristics; and even the effects of his incarceration on his family. Not only is the literature vast but
the expenditure of money and concern for the defendant has also been
enormous . . . . In comparison, virtually nothing has been done on what
happens to the other group of citizens touched by the criminal justice
system, namely, the victims.
Id. at 19. See also Victim/Witness, supra note 72, at viii ("these individuals are
generally either ignored by our legal and social institutions or used by them as tools to
identify and punish offenders"); L. FoRER, supra note 20, at 29 ("in the conduct of
the trial, the victim is a non-person"); H. Brownell, The Forgotten Victims of Crime,
Thirty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Delivered Before The Association of The Bar of the City of New York (Mar. 4, 1976).
222. Statement of Judge Sylvia Bacon, Immediate Past Chairperson, on behalf of
the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA, Before The President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime 5, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bacon].
223. Bacon, supra note 222, at 5-6.
224. 5 Cal. App. 3d 617, 85 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Ct. App. 1970).
225. Id. at 622, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 503, 504. The men then discussed whether to kill
her or disfigure her face. The victim averted the danger by promising to help stage a
hold-up of the hotel the following night, where she would be working as cashier. Id.
at 504. The men were subsequently arrested and indicted for rape, kidnapping and
robbery. Id. In the plea negotiations, an agreement was reached whereby two of the
defendants would plead guilty to the robbery charge and one of the rape charges,
and in return the judge promised to send one of them to the California Youth
Authority and to dismiss the remaining charges. The other defendant would receive a
suspended sentence and be placed on probation. Id. at 623-24, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 50405. The probation officer recommended denial of probation. Id. at 625, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 506.
226. The judge stated: "I think it's a lousy deal when an inspector has to sit with a
client . . . . I think it's ridiculous . . . . I never heard of a sentencing procedure
where people have to be in court with a policeman holding their hand." Id. at 625
n.6, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.6.
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that the defendants were at liberty on bail after their guilty pleas and
that "[i]t seems idle even to point out that [the victim] should not be
obliged to chance an unescorted confrontation with her self-confessed
ravagers or their friends." 22 The court also noted that the trial judge's
"incomprehensible tirade" against the victim and the police officer
attending her, "obviously discouraged . . . her testimony as to the
228
details of the offense.
Some states are attempting to redress the lack of victim participation in the criminal justice system and the problems inherent in possible prosecutorial or judicial bias against victims by enacting statutes
which mandate that victims be provided with information concerning
the proceedings.229 One such statutory scheme, for example, mandates
that the District Attorncy inform the victim of a pending plea bargain
and of the date when the court will consider the recommendations, so
that the victim may be present. 230 This notification procedure was
designed to "help alleviate some of the confusion and alienation a
victim often feels and encourage victim cooperation in the prosecu231
tion."
Additional legislation in several states allows victims "to inform the
prosecutor, judge or jury of the crime's impact on their lives.1 2 32 In
New York, for example, a presentence report must "contain an analysis of the victim's version of the offense, the extent of injury or economic loss or damage and the amount of restitution sought by the
victim," when the information is relevant to the question of sentence. 2 3 3 New York also specifies that one of the purposes of the penal
law is "to provide for an appropriate public response to particular
for
offenses, including consideration of the consequences of the offense
234
the victim, including the victim's family and the community.
227. Id. at 626, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
228. Id. at 633, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12. The court ultimately reversed the
granting of probation to one of the defendants because it found that the judge abused
his discretion by deciding the issue of probation long before he possessed all the
relevant facts. Id. at 633, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 511. The court also held that the dismissal
of kidnapping and rape charges was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 638, 85 Cal. Rptr.
at 514.
229. Victim/ Witness, supra note 72, at 28.
230. Id. at 30.
231. Id. at 29.
232. Id. at 46. Indiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York and Ohio, for
example, have such statutes. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. R. 35-5-6-4 (Burns 1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 176.145 (1981); 1979 N.H. Laws 330 (SB 79); N.Y. CuM. PRoc. LAW §
390.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 (Page
1982).
233. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 390.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
234. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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A recently enacted federal law provides that the presentence report
must contain "information concerning any harm, including financial,
social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by
any victim of the offense; and any other information that may aid the
court in sentencing, including the restitution needs of any victim of
2' 35
the offense.
As the A.B.A. has noted, victim impact statements are likely to
result in stiffer sentencing by emphasizing the consequences to the
victim, as well as the motives of the defendant. 23 The goal of considering the offender, the offense and the victim, however, is to arrive at
a just and effective sentence. Such a sentence is not necessarily a
lengthy one. As commentators have stated that prison does not rehabilitate, 237 alternatives to imprisonment should increasingly be used
238
when the crime is not a violent one.
Concern has also been expressed that allowance for oral presentation by victims may present the possibility of emotional outburst from

235. Omnibus Victims Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248,
1249.
236. Victim/Witness, supra note 72, at 47.
237. "Rehabilitation is sometimes called 'treatment.' Imprisonment as treatment?
It would be laughable if it were not so tragic." L. ForEn, supra note 20, at 86;
Frankel, supra note 24, at 31.

238. B. ALPER

&

L.

NICHOLS, BEYOND THE COURTROOM

56-58 (1981). Restitution is

one such alternative. One restitutionary scheme is that of the self-determinate sentence, whereby prisoners could work a forty-hour work week at full union rates until
their crimes were paid for from their earnings. This scheme would encourage their
ability as wage-earners and would increase awareness that crime "is not a paying
proposition." Id. Other alternatives are pretrial diversion, where young offenders
charged with offenses other than violent crimes are taught skills, placed in jobs,
counseled and referred to appropriate community agencies. Id. at 39-45. For a
discussion of community service as an alternative sentence to imprisonment, see id. at
175-94.
The Omnibus Victims Protection Act of 1982 also provides for restitution as an
alternative to imprisonment or as an addition to imprisonment. If the court does not
order restitution, it must state its reasons on the record. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248, 1253. Since a primary reason for "street" criminality, see L. FoRER, supra note
20, at 209 ("Street crime" is a term used to describe crimes other than "white-collar"
crime. "Street crime is what most people mean when they talk about crime"), is the
"need and deprivation on the part of disadvantaged members of society," Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, in SENTENCINc 284, 293 (1981), society should do all it can
to educate and aid convicts in gaining meaningful skills, so that other means of
livelihood besides career crime can be learned. Perhaps columnist Art Buchwald's
suggestion, though made in jest, has some kernel of merit to it: that "appropriate
public service for these [white-collar] offenders would be to teach people in the slums
...how to [draw] up phony contracts ... [and hand] in invoices for overruns that
do not exist .... " L. ForER, supra note 20, at 207. Humor aside, one kind of
restitutionary sentence for "white-collar" criminals might be to teach business skills
to convicts who are lacking such skills, who in turn could make restitution to victims.
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the victim which would unfairly prejudice the judge. 23 Judges can,
however, be aware of a victim's pain and factor it into sentencing
deliberations without being swayed to violate their consciences. The
fear of emotional outbursts is not a reason for excluding victim information. This human presence may offset the "case-hardening" which
may occur after years on the bench. 240 In any event, use of a victim
impact statement instead of oral presentation by victims would preclude displays of emotion.
Because victims may be representative of those individuals who are
routinely targeted for certain types of crimes,2 4' granting them a voice
in the sentencing proceedings would service large segments of the
community.
V. Conclusion
A recent amendment of the New York State Penal Law specifies
that one purpose of the penal law is "to provide for an appropriate
public response to particular offenses, including consideration of the
consequences of the offense for the victim, including the victim's
family and the community."2 42 Although it is often stated that community opinion should not influence the judiciary, public response is a
powerful educational tool that should not be ignored. The fear that
judges will arrive at unjust sentencing decisions in slavish adherence to
public will is unjustified. Cases illustrate that judicial awareness of
public or community opinion does not lead inevitably to subservience
in the form of violation of due process or abuse of discretion. In fact,
deeper deliberation in sentencing and proportionate sentences have
often been the result.
Awareness of public response to particular types of crime can lead
to a more realistic appraisal of one of the factors in the sentencing
equation: the relative gravity of the offense. Intelligent use of public
opinion as an indicator rather than as a dictator should not lead to the
actual sentences urged by the public, nor even to lengthy prison terms,
but to sentences which bear relation to the gravity of the offense and
do not trivialize the impact of the crime on the victim. Giving voice to
victims of crime in the sentencing process would not only preclude
such trivialization; it would also serve to represent large sectors of the
community who are routinely targeted for specific types of crime.
Eve Kunen
239.
240.
1970),
241.
242.

Victim/Witness, supra note 72, at 47.
See, e.g., People v. Beasley, 5 Cal. App. 3d 617, 85 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Ct. App.
discussed at notes 224-28 supra and accompanying text.
See note 20 supra.
N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).

